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A U.S.-led naval operation in October 2003 interdicted a shipment of uranium-
enrichment components on-board a German cargo ship traveling from Dubai to Libya.  In 
December 2003, Libya announced it would halt its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs and eliminate its existing stockpiles under international verification and 
supervision. The George W. Bush Administration proclaimed the interdiction a triumph 
for the newly created Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity which was 
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Despite increasing international support, numerous joint exercises, and the 
successful Libyan intercept, the PSI faces serious legal, intelligence, and operational 
challenges to sustained effectiveness. This thesis takes a close look at these challenges 
and considers how they can be overcome.  I conclude that overcoming these challenges 
will require a multilateral trusted information network to augment secretive bilateral 
intelligence sharing, a PSI-specific legal umbrella to replace current reliance on only 
partially applicable international laws and resolutions, and an interoperable, team 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW  
A U.S.-led naval operation in October 2003 interdicted a shipment of uranium-
enrichment components on-board a German cargo ship traveling from Dubai to Libya.1  
The naval operation resulted in the seizure of thousands of uranium-centrifuge parts.  
Both American and British officials mark the interception of the ship, based on timely 
and accurate intelligence information, as the turning point in nonproliferation 
negotiations with Libya.  On 19 December 2003, Libya announced it would halt its 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)2 development programs and eliminate stockpiles of 
weapons under international verification and supervision.3 The George W. Bush 
Administration proclaimed the interdiction as a triumph for the newly created 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  First announced by President Bush at a speech in 
Krakow, Poland on 31 May 2003, the PSI is a response to the international spread of 
WMD, delivery systems, and related materials.  It is a multi-national effort to interdict -- 
that is, cut off or prohibit through the threat or actual use of force -- land, sea, and air 
trafficking of WMD at the earliest possible point.4 
Despite this successful Libyan interdiction, intelligence, legal, and operational 
challenges to future PSI effectiveness remain.  This thesis identifies these challenges and 
provides prescriptions to overcome them.  In this first chapter I discuss how the PSI fits 
into the nonproliferation puzzle and review to date accomplishments of the initiative.   
Chapter II stresses the importance of actionable intelligence to the PSI’s success, and the 
challenge of multilateral intelligence sharing.  Chapter III considers the legal framework 
                                                 
 
1 The BBC China is a freighter owned by a German-based company, BBC Chartering and Logistic 
GmbH. 
2 WMD usually refers to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 
3 Samia Amin, “Recent Developments in Libya,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (10 
February 2004), 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Factsheets/libyaunconventionalweapons.htm, last accessed 
Feb 04. 
4 “Talking Points on the Proliferation Security Initiative,” FCNL Issues (8 January 2004)” 
http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=642&issue_id=34, last accessed Jan 04. 
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for the PSI and the challenges to the PSI’s legal authority.  Chapter IV reviews the 
operational challenges of ground, air, and sea interdiction, as well as the challenges of 
detecting different types of WMD.  The concluding chapter issues a PSI report card, 
summarizes areas needing improvement, and recommends course of actions to address 
deficiencies.    
B. KEY FINDINGS 
I identify collection, sharing, issues of trust, and exercise restrictions as 
intelligence challenges to PSI effectiveness.  The collection challenge is a byproduct of a 
Cold War reliance on satellite technology, and a lack of human intelligence sources.  
Bilateral agreements, restrictions on sharing intelligence and the secretive nature of 
intelligence agencies challenge PSI’s multilateral sharing goals.  Poor intelligence 
estimates of Iraq’s WMD program have created distrust for U.S. and British intelligence 
services and challenge the credibility of PSI intelligence assessments.  PSI exercises are 
currently using watered-down scripts due to intelligence sharing restrictions, which do 
not allow PSI partners to practice like they play.  Overcoming these intelligence 
challenges requires a structured approach to intelligence sharing.  A NATO-administered 
trusted information network with an onus on punishing violators is prescribed as a first 
generation structure for PSI intelligence sharing. 
After establishing that the Libyan interdiction was more a result of unusual 
circumstances than a legal justification, I identify the lack of coverage of PSI interdiction 
principles in the UN International Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention and non-
applicability of UN articles, resolutions, and statements as legal challenges to PSI 
effectiveness.  The LOS Convention, the defining body of laws for maritime transit, does 
not restrict free passage of WMD related material in territorial waters.  Article 51 of the 
UN Charter only allows for self-defense actions when armed attacks occur.  Neither UN 
Security Resolution 1540 nor the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 1992 
specifically justifies offensive actions against WMD traffickers.  I prescribe several 
options for overcoming the LOS Convention challenge, to include:  operating outside the 
convention, changing the LOS, or creating a new treaty.  I conclude the chapter by 
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arguing that legal questions regarding PSI interdictions will continue to plague the 
initiative until a PSI-specific UN Security Council Resolution is adopted. 
Operational challenges to PSI effectiveness include interoperability, detection, 
and the use of force during air-intercepts.  Training, tactics, and communication 
challenges can be overcome by adopting a team approach to interdiction operations 
similar to that of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.   Detection challenges require 
technological improvements in WMD detection capabilities and a PSI partnership with 
industry.  The use of force during air-intercepts is a challenge that is best fought on the 
ground.  While PSI participants can continue to practice air-intercepts, airport security 
and customs exercises would prove more worthwhile in the long-run.   
C.   WHY PSI? 
The PSI is one of seven new measures proposed by President Bush to help combat 
the development and spread of WMD.5  The PSI has been presented as a global initiative 
without targeting any specific nation or organization.  However, Under Secretary of State 
John Bolton has indicated that North Korea and Iran warrant the most attention because 
of the assumed maturity of their nuclear programs designed for weapons use.6 The PSI is 
designed to address a WMD proliferation problem that keeps growing, and the inability 
of current nonproliferation efforts to fully thwart this problem.  The PSI fills a gap 
between the current treaty-based approach to nonproliferation and more assertive 
counterproliferation measures. 
1. The Proliferation Problem 
Willing proliferators, loopholes in existing nonproliferation regimes, and 
vulnerable materials and stockpiles have accelerated the WMD proliferation problem.  
Mohammed ElBaradei, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director, warns:   
We are actually having a race against time which I don’t think we can 
afford.  The danger is so imminent…not only with regard to countries 
                                                 
 
5 WMD refers to a category that covers nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that can result in 
massive amounts of destruction and loss of life. 
6 “Talking Points on the Proliferation Security Initiative.”  
 4
acquiring nuclear weapons but also terrorists getting their hands on some 
of these nuclear materials, uranium, or plutonium.7 
Public warnings from the United Nations (UN) nuclear watchdog place an added 
emphasis on keeping WMD out of the hands of those inclined to use it.  Alarmingly, 
these WMD materials continue to be bought and smuggled in numerous markets.  The 
number of countries possessing WMD and related technology continues to increase.  The 
following sections provide an estimate of current WMD proliferators and capabilities. 
a. The Nuclear Problem 
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, worldwide 
nuclear stockpiles are now estimated to total over 28,000 nuclear weapons; these include:  
10,000 from the U.S., 17,000 from Russia, 410 from China, 350 from France, 185 from 
the U.K., 100 from Israel, 50-90 from India, and 30-50 from Pakistan.8  Adding to the list 
of current nuclear states and potential nuclear states are two prongs of the George W. 
Bush Administration’s axis of evil, Iran and North Korea (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.   Declared, de facto, and threshold nuclear states, from NNSA9                                                  
 
7 “Nuclear Terror Matter of Time,” BBC News (21 June 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/americas/3827589.stm, last accessed  Jul 04. 
8 “Nuclear Weapons,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/weapons/weapon.asp?ID=3&weapon=nuclear#useful, last accessed Jul 
04. 
9 “Nuclear Weapon States,” National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 
http://www.llnl.gov/nai/zdiv/weap.html, last accessed Jul 04. 
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b. The Chemical Problem 
A large number of chemical weapons states have abandoned their 
programs and destroyed their weapons since the establishment of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).10 Yet, many countries have not joined the CWC.  These include 
Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and Syria.  China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Syria 
are believed to have some quantities of undeclared chemical weapons.  Sudan, India, and 
Pakistan are believed to have some capability to produce or have actively researched 
chemical weapons (see Figure 2).11  
 
Figure 2.   The world's chemical weapons states, from Deadly Arsenals12 
 
c. The Biological Problem 
Many nations gave up their biological warfare programs and destroyed 
their biological weapons stockpiles as a result of the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC).  These countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, states of the Former Soviet Union, and South Africa.13 Russia continues 
to be the primary proliferation concern.  Although Russian leadership claims to have 
                                                 
 
10 The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of 
chemical weapons. It was opened for signature in 1993, and entered into force in 1997. The Organisation 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague, established by the convention, is 
responsible for the implementation. 
11“Chemical Weapons,” 
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/weapons/weapon.asp?ID=2&weapon=chemical, last accessed Jul 04. 
12 Ibid. 
13 The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibited the development, production, and 
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and mandated their destruction.  It was signed 
in Washington, London, and Moscow on 10 April, 1972, and entered into force on 26 March, 1975. 
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destroyed biological stockpiles, some may remain.  Other states such as Israel, China, and 
North Korea may have the capability to produce significant quantities of biological 
agents for military use.  Iran, Pakistan, India, Egypt, and Syria are suspected of trying to 
acquire the capability (see Figure 3).14 
 
Figure 3.   The world's biological weapons states, from Deadly Arsenals15 
 
d. The Proliferation Network Problem 
The scope of proliferation is expanding in the Middle East and East Asia 
with the development of new or improved chemical, biological, nuclear, and long-range 
missile programs. These weapons, which give potential adversaries the ability to respond 
asymmetrically in light of U.S. conventional superiority, also appear to be easier to 
acquire then was previously supposed.  Recent discoveries shed light on the scope of 
Abdul Qadeer Khan’s contributions to placing the world’s most destructive weapons in 
the hands of known proliferation threats and non-state actors.  Operating as the world’s 
nuclear “Wal-Mart”, the father of the Pakistani bomb turned out to be a global nuclear 
proliferator.16  The international network of suppliers he built to support uranium 
enrichment efforts in Pakistan also supported similar efforts in other countries.  Khan and 
his network of suppliers were unique in being able to offer one-stop shopping for 
                                                 
 
14 “Biological Weapons”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/weapons/weapon.asp?ID=1&weapon=biological, last accessed Jul 04. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Peter Brookes, “Nukes for Sale,” CNSNEWS.COM (10 February 2004), http://www.cnsnews.com 
last accessed Feb 04. 
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enrichment technology as well as weapons design information.  This allowed a 
potentially wide range of countries to leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of nuclear 
weapons’ development programs.17  
WMD acquisitions are not always the work of secret criminal networks 
that skirt international law.  More often, they are done by businessmen, in the open, in 
what seems to be legal trade in high-technology.  Biotechnology is especially dual-edged, 
easily supporting both medical programs and biological weapons.18 For example, various 
North Korean facilities19 can be construed as having a purpose that could contribute to an 
infrastructure for research as well as development of biological weapons.20  
Additionally, Russia and China continue to export WMD-related materials 
and technology.  Although Beijing has taken steps to improve its export control, China 
continues to be a leading source of relevant technology and ballistic missile 
proliferation.21  Russian WMD materials and technology remain vulnerable to theft or 
diversion.  According to Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee:   
Facilities at Shchuch'ye in western Siberia, containing some 1.9 million 
deadly nerve gas munitions, most of them small enough to fit into a 
briefcase, are stored in run-down wooden warehouses. At Pokrov, a 
former biological weapons facility, I saw vials of deadly pathogens used 
for vaccine research that could also be employed by terrorists. This 
operation needs to be better secured and downsized to reduce the risk.  
Russia still has 340 tons of inadequately secured fissile material, as well as 
70 warhead facilities and 20 biological pathogen sites that need security 
improvements. We also need to tackle the problem of Russia's battlefield                                                  
 
17 “The Worldwide Threat 2004:  Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” Testimony of Director of 
Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Central 
Intelligence Agency (24 February 2004),  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/dci_speech_02142004.html, last accessed Sep 04. 
18 Ibid. 
19 These facilities include:  The Institute and Syringe, Factory, Reagent Company, (Synthetic) 
Pharmaceutical Division of Hamhung Clinical Medicine Institute, Institute (Pyongyang), Pharmaceutical 
Plant (located approximately forty kilometers from P’yongyang), Kyong-t’ae Endoctrinology Institute, and 
the Sanitary Quaranting Institute (germ vaccination institute).    
20 “North Korea Biological Profile,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/bio/fac/NKB_Fo_GO.html, last accessed Jul 04. 
21 “The Worldwide Threat 2004:  Challenges in a Changing Global Context.” 
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nuclear weapons, which pose an even greater terrorist risk than its 
strategic warheads because they are more portable and not as well 
guarded.22 
The vulnerability of Russian materials coupled with the eagerness of Russia’s cash-
strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries to raise 
funds via exports and transfers, makes Russian materials an attractive target for countries 
and groups seeking WMD and missile-related assistance.23  The continuation of the flow 
of WMD technology and materials represents a failure of the international 
nonproliferation regime and counterproliferation efforts that appear unprepared to fight at 
the crossroads of WMD radicalism and technology cited by the U.S. president.  
2. WMD Trafficking Problem 
According to the IAEA, from 1992 to 2002 more than one hundred and seventy-
five attempts by terrorists or criminals to obtain or smuggle radioactive substances were 
recorded worldwide with most coming from former Soviet satellite states.  The lack of 
standardized reporting protocols makes the full extent of such smuggling hard to 
ascertain.  Because of this reporting problem, the IAEA stresses that the total number of 
attempts is likely much higher. For example, of the five hundred attempts documented by 
the Russian Customs Agency to smuggle radioactive materials across Russian national 
frontier in 2000, only one case was reported to the IAEA.24   
Efforts designed to combat the smuggling of WMD historically focus on nuclear 
or radiological components.  That does not diminish to the likelihood of success that 
proliferators enjoy in smuggling chemical and biological materials.  Once WMD material 
of any type is stolen, misplaced, or intentionally shipped it could be anywhere.   Borders 
over which smugglers might travel stretch for thousands of miles, and millions of trucks, 
trains, ships, and airplanes cross legitimate international borders every year.  To make 
                                                 
 
22 Richard Lugar, “Seize This Chance to Destroy Weapons,” Industry Star.Com (1 August 2004), 
http://www.indystar.com/articles/8/166592-6368-021.html, last accessed Aug 04. 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Nuclear Smuggling, A First Step to Nuclear Terrorism,” The Jewish Institute for National Security 
Affairs (19 August 2003),  
http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/170/documentid/2176/history/3,2360,6
52,170,2176, last accessed Aug 04. 
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matters worse, officials tasked to guard these borders are often poorly paid, 
geographically isolated, and susceptible to corruption.25  
Using interdiction of drug trafficking as a measuring stick, it is easy to understand 
the challenge of stopping the smuggling of WMD.  The United States is able to stop only 
twenty-five percent of the hundreds of tons of South American cocaine smuggled over its 
borders each year.  The running joke is that the easiest way to bring nuclear, chemical, or 
biological material into the country would be to hide it in a bale of marijuana.  Because 
the world is ever becoming more interconnected and borders are becoming more porous, 
every nation’s border is vulnerable to the entry of destructive materials.26 
3. Attacking the Proliferation Problem in the Past 
For five decades the proliferation problem has been attacked by an international 
treaty-based nonproliferation regime.  Fifty years ago, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
gave his “Atoms for Peace” address to the UN General Assembly.  He proposed sharing 
nuclear materials and information for peaceful purposes through international agencies.  
That speech led to the creation of the IAEA several years later.  Today, the IAEA has the 
dual responsibility to police peaceful nuclear programs, while ensuring they do not make 
nuclear weapons.  The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, and 
entered into force in 1970, gave the IAEA authority to police the nuclear activities of 
member countries while ensuring those without nuclear weapons did not acquire 
weapons.  Today, one hundred eighty seven states subscribe to the NPT.27  
The UN Security Council is assigned the role of enforcement of the major 
multilateral agreements.  The IAEA acts under the UN Charter as the verification arm of 
the council.  The performance of the council over the last ten years has been marked by 
inconsistency, self-interested decision making, and inability to force compliance.28  One 
                                                 
 
25 Anthony Wier, “Introduction:  Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling,” NTI (27 August 2002), 
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of the most damaging blows to the NPT was Iraq’s demonstrated ability to hide its 
nuclear-weapon-making efforts from IAEA inspectors before the first U.S. / Iraqi Gulf 
War.29 In addition, continued U.S. suspicion over the thoroughness of weapons 
inspections prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) contributed to a decision for military 
intervention.  The inspection program is hampered by the NPT itself.  Article IV of the 
NPT allows for an “inalienable right” to all nuclear fuel-cycle technologies for peaceful 
purposes.30 This makes the job of inspectors more difficult, making necessary the 
distinction between nuclear materials to be used for peace and those used for war. 
Compliance problems with the NPT extend beyond rogue nations.  In Article VI 
of the NPT, the United States and other recognized nuclear-weapon states promised to 
negotiate weapons reductions, with the goal of nuclear disarmament.  The United States 
has since withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and publicized its 
desire to integrate nuclear weapons at all levels of warfare in the 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR).31 This has led other countries to criticize U.S. compliance with the NPT, 
which makes it more difficult politically to mobilize multilateral support for enforcing 
NPT compliance by potential rogue-state proliferators. 
Similar efforts to control chemical and biological weapons proliferation, such as 
the CWC and BWC, also have resulted in mixed success.  These treaties have made 
significant strides in eliminating stockpiles from participating countries, but have failed 
to deter the countries of most concern.  Non-signatories to these conventions, such as 
China, North Korea, and Syria, retain the capability to produce significant quantities of 
chemical or biological agents and remain a proliferation concern. 
4. Attacking the WMD Trafficking Problem in the Past 
Prior to the introduction of the PSI in May of 2003, the United States along with 
the international community took some steps to deal with the WMD trafficking problem 
without specifically tackling every dimension it.  Attention was focused on training,                                                  
 
29 Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty:  History and Current Problems.” 
30 Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal, “North Korea and Iran:  Test Cases for an Improved 
Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today (December 2003), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/CirincioneandWolfsthal.asp, last accessed Sep 04. 
31  Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty:  History and Current Problems.” 
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detection equipment, and cooperation among countries dedicated to interdicting WMD 
traffickers.  Table 1 lists some of programs designed to stop the trafficking of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological materials.   
Programs Focus 
U.S. Department of Energy Second Line of 
Defense 
Installing radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear 
material passing through key ports and border crossings in 
Russia and other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the 
Former Soviet Union, train officials on the use of the 
equipment, and link that equipment to a communications 
system 
U.S. Department of State Export Control and 
Related Border Security Assistance 
Funds equipment, training, and legal and regulatory assistance 
to control illicit trafficking in nuclear and other WMD and 
related materiel in and around the NIS, as well as several other 
regions of the world 
U.S. Department of Defense International 
Counterproliferation 
Collaborates with the U.S. Customs Service and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to provide equipment and training to 
customs and law enforcement counterparts in the NIS and in 
Southern and Eastern Europe 
U.S. Department of Defense Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation Prevention Program 
Focuses on collaborating with internal and border security 
forces in key NIS states, especially those of Central Asia, to 
improve their ability to interdict smuggling not just at ports and 
customs checkpoints but along the whole length of these 
countries’ land, air, and sea borders 
IAEA and other international efforts to combat 
WMD smuggling 
Includes educating officials on the problem, improving 
scientific capacity to detect WMD material and to determine 
where it came from, and fostering cooperation among those 
nations trying to interdict WMD smuggling. 
Table 1. Programs Addressing Smuggling of WMD, from NTI32 
None of the programs in table 1 attack the heart of what the PSI intends to do, 
interdict weapons and materials in transit.  The PSI is an attempt to go beyond the 
interdiction operations of the past that were tied to checkpoints, borders, and Soviet 
stomping grounds.  While PSI accounts for these areas, its mission is to stop the transfer 
of WMD to anyone at any place and time.  This means that interdictions can take place 
near borders and checkpoints or on the high seas and unrestricted airspace.  Covering the 
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areas proliferators may choose to use necessitates a level of international cooperation that 
can only be achieved through continuous joint training and exercises. 
5.   The PSI – Part of the Future Solution 
The PSI complements the treaty-based nonproliferation regime of the past by 
focusing on stopping WMD in transit.  PSI activities can fall under the treaty-based 
nonproliferation umbrella or more assertive military counterproliferation measures, 
depending on what the activity actually entails.  According to the U.S. Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the PSI includes diplomacy and interdiction.33   
a. The PSI as Diplomacy 
By building international support regarding the importance of stopping the 
flow of WMD to rogue-states and non-state actors, the PSI is institutionalizing and 
creating a norm to stop transfers and transactions of WMD programs.  This norm calls on 
each PSI core member and supporter to contribute based on its own ability and legal 
authority.  Paragraph 10 of the April 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 supports 
the formation of this norm by “calling on all States, in accordance with their national 
legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative 
action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, their 
means of delivery, and related materials.”34   
John Bolton, the U.S. State Department’s diplomatic face of the PSI, 
spearheads an effort that has landed 15 core PSI members and over 60 supporting 
countries.   This multilateral diplomatic focus supports the U.S. 2002 National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which states: 
The United States will actively employ diplomatic approaches in bilateral 
and multilateral settings to dissuade supplier states from cooperating with 
proliferating states.  Countries will be held responsible for their 
commitments, nonproliferation coalitions will be formed, and increased 
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 13
support for nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation programs 
will be sought.35 
The participants willing to take responsibility for a share of the nonproliferation load 
bring different capabilities to the table.  The PSI adds a political imperative to cooperate, 
enhancing multilateral sharing, and bridging in-transit nonproliferation gaps that were 
previously left open.  It is intended to avoid the need for unanimous support, enabling 
smaller coalitions to take action. 
b. The PSI as Interdiction 
The PSI’s focus on interdicting WMD shipments is also supportive of the 
2002 National Strategy, which states: 
Effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD 
and their delivery means.  We must enhance the capabilities of our 
military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to 
prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to 
hostile states and terrorist organizations.36 
Effective interdiction does not always equal military interdiction.  According to OSD 
officials, PSI interdictions will not always include military action, and may more closely 
resemble the law enforcement model utilized in stopping in-transit drug smuggling.37 
By interdicting WMD shipments, the PSI triggers deterrence by denial.  
The threat that a shipment will be stopped and potentially seized should act as a deterrent 
to potential WMD suppliers and recipients.  For suppliers, seizure could lead to 
embarrassing exposure with the possibility of political, economic, or military sanctions 
by PSI member states.  For recipients, interdiction risks exposing what in most cases are 
covert programs to build a secret WMD capability.  This exposure could trigger 
responses from a variety of international organizations and state actors, to include 
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inspections, sanctions, or military action.38  The deterrent nature of PSI interdiction also 
supports the 2002 national strategy, which states: 
We require new methods of deterrence.  A strong declaratory policy and 
effective military forces are essential elements of our contemporary 
deterrent posture, along with a full range of political tools to persuade 
potential adversaries not to seek or use WMD.39  
President Bush, PSI supporting states, and now the UN Security Council have declared 
that transport of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons will not be tolerated.  By 
taking disorganized efforts to interdict WMD shipments and giving them a multilateral 
structure, the PSI attempts to build a deterrent to transporting these shipments.   
D.   PSI PARTICIPANTS 
On 12 June 2003, the first PSI meeting notes identified core PSI participants as:  
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  In the first meeting, participants also expressed 
the desire to broaden support for and, as appropriate, participation in the PSI.  This 
broadened support would include all countries prepared to play a role in proactive 
measures to interdict shipments of WMD and related materials.40 Following the third PSI 
meeting on 3-4 September 2003, the 11 participants approached other countries to seek 
support for interdiction principles agreed upon during the meeting.  Thus far, over sixty 
countries have expressed support for the principles.  Notes from the fourth meeting 
included the statement that PSI participation would vary with the activity taking place, 
and the contribution the participants could provide.41   
On 11 February 2004, President Bush revealed the first expansion of the initiative 
during a speech at the National Defense University, in which he outlined U.S. proposals 
to stop proliferation. “Three more governments—Canada and Singapore and Norway—
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will be participating in [PSI],” the president said.42  These states, as well as Denmark and 
Turkey, attended a Washington-hosted PSI meeting (the fifth) in December.   
The first anniversary meeting of the PSI on 31 May 2004 brought a welcome gift.  
Russia, which had remained cool to the PSI out of concern that interdicting cargo in 
transit did not square well with universally accepted transit laws, became PSI’s fifteenth 
core member.  John Bolton is excited about Moscow’s participation, noting:  “Russia is a 
great naval power and it has extensive land and airspace that can be used for commercial 
activities, which we hope and expect, will now be closed to proliferators.”43 Russia’s 
membership signifies acceptance of PSI interdiction principles, but not without 
reservation.  Moscow’s unease has not disappeared.  In a 1 June 2004 statement, Russia’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, “We presume that activity under this initiative 
should not and will not create any obstacles to lawful economic, scientific, and 
technological cooperation of states.”44    
With Russia on-board, Bolton will now likely turn his attention to China.  State 
Department spokesperson Richard Boucher said on 17 February 2004, “we have seen 
progress by China on proliferation issues, and they are very interested in the Proliferation 
Security Initiative.”45 However, Beijing offers a much less optimistic view of the 
initiative, citing concerns with the legality of interdiction on the open seas.  In a 12 
February 2004 press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue 
responded to a question about the PSI by stating, “We believe that the issue of 
proliferation shall be resolved through political and diplomatic means within the 
framework of international laws, and all nonproliferation measures shall contribute to 
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peace, security, and stability in the region and the world at large.”46  As of July 2004, 
China is still not a PSI member, but is no longer publicly criticizing PSI. 
The U.S. State Department does not envision or support regular meetings of the 
PSI core countries but contends that it may be useful or necessary to have various PSI 
participating states meet periodically to exchange information or to refine details about 
the initiative.  In addition, regular meetings of expert working groups (operational, 
intelligence and political), in the United States are expected in the future.47 
E. PSI RESULTS TO DATE 
PSI participants have agreed on guidelines for information sharing, documented 
governing interdiction principles, and taken part in multilateral training exercises.  In 
addition, the PSI has been credited with the interdiction of a cargo ship containing WMD 
materials. 
1. Information Sharing 
At the September 2003 PSI meeting in Paris, participants agreed to the following 
general guidelines for information exchange: 
 Countries commit to seek to release information to other PSI 
participants to facilitate timely sharing of information to identify, 
monitor, disrupt or interdict proliferation activities of concern. 
 Countries will release information to other PSI participants, and 
receiving countries agree to accept information in accordance with 
existing national rules of release of operationally sensitive information 
or intelligence to third parties. 
 Countries agree not to release any information received from a PSI 
country for PSI purposes to a third party, including other PSI 
countries, without the specific consent of the originating country. 
 Countries agree to afford protection to any information received from 
a PSI country for PSI purposes at substantially the same level it would 
receive in the originating country. 
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 Countries agree to provide feedback on PSI operations conducted as a 
result of information supplied by another PSI country to the 
originating country.48 
Though initially addressed by these guidelines, intelligence and information sharing 
remain a major challenge to the effectiveness the PSI’s multilateral nonproliferation 
effort.  According to officials at the U.S. Center for Weapons Intelligence, 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control (WINPAC), the PSI is not intended to be an 
intelligence sharing forum.49  It is unlikely that PSI interdictions will involve more than a 
handful of countries at a time due to established intelligence sharing restrictions. 
2. Interdiction Principles 
At the third meeting the participants also agreed to the following four governing 
principles of interdiction which call on states concerned about proliferation to: 
 Take steps to interdict the transfer or transport of WMD, delivery 
systems, and related systems to and from states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern; 
 Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of information 
regarding suspected proliferation activity; 
 Strengthen both national legal authorities and relevant international 
law to support PSI commitments; and 
 Take specific actions to support interdiction of cargoes of WMD, 
delivery systems, and related materials consistent with national and 
international laws, including not transporting such cargoes, boarding 
and searching vessels flying flags that are reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes, allowing authorities from other states to stop 
and search vessels in international waters, interdicting aircraft 
transiting sovereign airspace that are suspected of carrying prohibited 
cargoes, and inspecting all types of transportation vehicles using ports, 
airfields, or other facilities for the transshipment of prohibited 
cargoes.50 
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Like information sharing, the multilateral operational aspect of the interdiction 
principles remains a major challenge to the effectiveness of the PSI.  The interdiction 
principles have remained unchanged since their inception, with now over sixty countries 
supporting them. 
3.  Training Exercises 
To help overcome operational challenges, PSI members have undertaken ten 
training exercises between the adoption of the interdiction principles and June 2004: 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercises 
September 10-13, 
2003 
Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR: Australia-led maritime 
exercise conducted in the Coral Sea  
October 8-10, 2003  Air CPX: United Kingdom-led air-interception command 
post (tabletop) exercise conducted in London, UK 
October 13-17, 2003  Exercise SANSO 03: Spain-led maritime exercise 
conducted in the Western Mediterranean  
November 25-27, 2003  Exercise BASILIC 03: France-led maritime exercise 
conducted in the Western Mediterranean,  
January 11-17, 2004  Exercise SEA SABER: United States-led maritime 
exercise conducted in the Arabian Sea, U.S. 
February 19, 2004  Exercise AIR BRAKE 04: Italian-led air-interception 
exercise conducted over Italy (Trapani)  
March 31-April 1, 2004  Exercise HAWKEYE: Germany-led customs exercise 
conducted in Germany (Frankfurt Airport)  
April 19-22, 2004  Exercise CLEVER SENTINEL: Italy-led maritime 
exercise conducted in the Mediterranean  
April 19-21, 2004  Exercise SAFE BORDERS: Poland-led ground 
interdiction exercise conducted in Poland (vicinity 
Wroclaw)  
June 23-24, 2004  Exercise APSE 04: France-led simulated air-interception 
exercise  
Table 2. PSI Exercises, from U.S. Department of State51 
 
The exercises thus far have been worthwhile but need to be more robust.  They were 
initially scheduled for public relations to show that the PSI was more than diplomats 
sitting around a table.  PSI members wanted their image to be operational right from the 
start.  Ground, maritime, air-interception, and international airport training exercises 
planned in the future suggest PSI nations are taking seriously the complex nature of 
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interdicting WMD, and are endeavoring to exercise all conceivable aspects of possible 
interdictions.  Future exercises, now planned through 2006, will increase in the 
complexity of intelligence sharing, legal authorities, and political decision-making.52 A 
summary of exercise objectives and lessons learned is included in chapter four. 
4. Interdictions 
While PSI exercises and training continue, the participating states have already 
undertaken interdiction operations.  PSI participants contend these cases will be 
announced and discussed with the public in only a few cases.  An important, publicly 
announced case concerned the interdiction of a German-owned ship, tracked from Dubai, 
bound for Libya.  Centrifuges used for producing nuclear weapons through highly 
enriched uranium were found on-board the ship.  Two months after the interdiction, 
Libya announced its intention to terminate all WMD programs and research.  On the 
surface, the Libyan WMD interdiction appears to be a success story for the PSI.  Chapter 
three of this thesis argues that the intercept may have been more a factor of luck (the right 
players at the right time) or deliberate distribution of intelligence by the Libyan 
government. 
It is unlikely that future interdictions will be labeled PSI or non-PSI.  What is 
more likely is that the PSI’s structure will facilitate interdictions on a case-by-case basis 
where the involvement of PSI core member states and those states supporting the 
interdiction principles will vary.  Any interdiction involving a PSI member or supporter 
can in essence by claimed as a victory for the PSI.  With the growing list of PSI 
supporters, it would be tough to fathom a future WMD interdiction without ties to the 
foundation being laid by the PSI today.  
F. CONCLUSION  
On 31 May 2003 President Bush proposed the PSI in general terms to the Group 
of Eight (G-8) during a summit in Poland.  Specifically he said: 
When WMD or their components are in transit, we must have the means 
and authority to seize them.  So today I announce a new effort to fight 
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proliferation call the PSI.  The United States and a number of close allies, 
including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search 
planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or 
missile technologies.  Over time, we will extend this partnership as 
broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive weapons away 
from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies.53 
Now, more than a year later, the PSI resume includes:  7 international meetings, 15 core 
members, over 60 supporters, published interdiction principles and information sharing 
guidelines, 10 multilateral training exercises, and credit for an operational interdiction 
tied to the dismantling of Libya’s WMD program.  
President Bush has rallied around the initiative he announced over a year ago.  He 
continues to publicly support the initiative and praises its utility at every conceivable 
opportunity.  The current momentum of the PSI makes it likely to survive the next 
presidential election, even if it is under a new name.  Future PSI success will be a factor 
of the availability of actionable intelligence, legal authority, and operational capability to 
interdict WMD shipments.  The intelligence, legal, and operational challenges to the PSI 
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II.  INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
According to former CIA Director George Tenet, “Intelligence has never been 
more important to the security of our country.”54 Intelligence failures are blamed for the 
destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001.  At the same time, critical 
and timely intelligence is credited with the PSI’s most important accomplishment thus 
far, seizing WMD materials on-board the BBC China.55 According to the U.S. National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the highest U.S. intelligence priority 
is “a more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of WMD threats.”56 
Accurate intelligence allows PSI participants to prevent proliferation and deter or defend 
against known proliferators and terrorist threats.  This intelligence is the key to 
developing effective counter and nonproliferation policies and capabilities.  Emphasis on 
improving intelligence regarding WMD-related facilities and activities, proliferation 
markets, and means of transit is crucial to the mission of the PSI.57 
Together, the core participants in the PSI certainly have the military power and 
logistical reach to confront any enemy, virtually anywhere on the earth.  But only 
intelligence can provide forewarning and pinpoint the time, place, and means of WMD 
transit needed for a successful interdiction.58 PSI participants will only be able to act in 
concert with the international community when they can present objective and conclusive 
proof of the need to intercept a suspect shipment.  This proof will help avoid erroneous 
judgments and international disagreements over weapons capabilities and intentions.59 
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This thesis chapter examines the intelligence challenges to future PSI 
effectiveness.  I first look at the importance of sharing intelligence as a mechanism to 
combat WMD proliferators.  Next, I consider the limitations of intelligence and the 
expectations of PSI participants regarding its use.  I then scrutinize the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, the world’s most powerful intelligence apparatus, as means to help identify 
intelligence challenges facing the PSI.  Collection, information-sharing, trust, and 
exercise constraints are identified and discussed as the challenges.  Finally, I prescribe a 
first generation trusted information network under the care of NATO, as an initial PSI 
intelligence sharing structure to combat these challenges.   
B.   WHY SHARE INTELLIGENCE?  
With the onus for PSI success resting largely on the shoulders of the intelligence 
community, the intelligence-sharing component of PSI should be its focus.  A 
recommendation from the recently released 9 / 11 Commission Report stresses the 
importance of information sharing:  “Information procedures should provide incentives 
for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge.”60  
Sharing information will allow the PSI to utilize the strength of collaboration, filling gaps 
where unilateral intelligence is incomplete.  John Bolton has at numerous times 
highlighted the importance of sharing intelligence to PSI success, the latest being in 
reference to Russia.  In a May 04 interview, Bolton explained:  “We expect that our 
intelligence sharing and law enforcement and military assets working with the Russian 
Federation will make a major contribution to our effort to interdict WMD trafficking 
worldwide.”61 Bolton’s statement rings of multilateral cooperation, but the challenges of 
sharing intelligence, discussed later in this chapter, have limited the progress toward this 
cooperation. 
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The Group of Eight (G-8)62 also recognizes the importance of intelligence sharing 
to combat the proliferation of WMD.  During an 11 May 2004 meeting, the G-8 agreed to 
push for enhanced sharing of intelligence to fight the war on terrorism.  The agreement 
calls for countries to “pass legislation if necessary to ensure that terrorism information 
can be shared internally with police and prosecutors and externally with other 
countries.”63 This agreement underscores the necessity of PSI participants to share 
resources and disband current barriers that minimize country-to-country information 
exchange.  Even the most robust information exchange environment will be subject to 
inherent limitations of intelligence, thus lowering expectations for intelligence timeliness 
and reliability. 
C. INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS AND PSI EXPECTATIONS 
The utility of intelligence is limited by assumptions used to gather it, preferences 
of people using it, and complexity of the information itself.  Taking these limitations into 
account, PSI participants should not expect actionable intelligence for every conceivable 
WMD shipment.  What can be expected are improvements to the current system, reliable 
assessment of intelligence accuracy, and robust intelligence sharing among PSI core 
members.  
1. Limitations 
Intelligence suffers from a number of potential weaknesses that tend to undercut 
its utility in the eyes of decision-makers.  First, is the fact that a certain amount of 
intelligence may be no more sophisticated than current conventional wisdom.  While 
conventional wisdom is usually dismissed out of hand, more is expected from 
intelligence.  Second, analysis is sometimes so dependent on technical data collection that 
it misses important intangibles.  For example, a straightforward analysis of the likelihood 
of thirteen colonies defeating the mighty British of the Eighteenth Century would have 
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deemed it near impossible.  Third, assuming that other states or individual actors will act 
as you do can undermine analysis.  For example, no U.S. policymaker would conceive of 
Japan bombing Pearl Harbor in December of 1941.  Fourth, policy makers, are free to 
reject or ignore the intelligence they are given.64 Policymakers want analysis to help 
them make informed decisions but often seek intelligence that supports their preferences, 
and ignore or even rebut intelligence and offer their own analysis.    
In descriptions of the intelligence process, the process may appear more rational 
and coherent than it actually is.65  The seven step process described by Mark Lowenthal 
in his book Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy is an oversimplified version of what 
actually takes place.66  In reality, intelligence includes a matrix of interconnected, mostly 
autonomous functions.  Policy decisions are sometimes inconsistent with the intelligence 
process.  There are times when the political motivations of the policymaker and a variety 
of ideological and organizational distortions infect the process.  Additionally, important 
intangibles may dramatically change the conditions of a given process.67 Thus, the 
intelligence process is wrought with additional variables that alter the inputs and outputs 
to the process, making its use suspect at times.  A formal review of U.S. intelligence, 
begun in June of 2003 by the Senate Select Committee, reported: 
Intelligence analysis is not a perfect science and we should not expect 
perfection from our intelligence community analysts.  It is entirely 
possible for an analyst to perform meticulous and skillful analysis and be 
completely wrong.  Likewise, it is also possible to perform careless and 
unskilled analysis and be completely right.  While intelligence is not an 
analytical function, it is the foundation upon which all good analysis is 
built.68 
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Being wrong about WMD trafficking is a scary proposition.  If perfection cannot be 
expected, as noted by the Senate Select Committee, then what can PSI partners expect 
from the intelligence community?   
2.  Expectations  
Real-time perfect knowledge of all WMD trafficking is a mountain PSI partners 
will likely never climb.  A more realistic intelligence expectation includes improvement, 
assessment, and transparency.  First, PSI partners should expect intelligence agencies to 
learn from Iraqi failures and improve suspect procedures.  A recent Congressional report 
on the October 2002 U.S. intelligence assessment of Iraqi WMD capabilities highlights 
several fallacies within the U.S. intelligence system that contributed to a 
mischaracterization of the intelligence prior to the 2003 U.S. war with Iraq.  These 
fallacies include:  inaccurate or inadequate explanation of uncertainties behind judgments 
in the intelligence estimate; “group think” among the intelligence community leading 
analysts, collectors, and managers to interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusive 
indications of a WMD program; a “layering effect” whereby assessments were built on 
previous judgments, carrying forward uncertainties as facts; analytic or collection failures 
resulting from inadequate supervision and loss of objectivity; significant shortcomings in 
almost every aspect of the intelligence community’s human intelligence collection 
efforts; and abuse by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), particularly in terms of 
information sharing.69 PSI partners can expect increased emphasis and resources to be 
applied to these problem areas, minimizing the likelihood of faulty intelligence to the 
level experienced with Iraq’s WMD program.   
Second, PSI partners should expect a level of assurance of intelligence reliability 
commensurate with the decision to use force.  Because any planned PSI interdiction 
could escalate into the use of military force upon non-compliance, the accuracy of the 
information must be unquestioned.  Intelligence analysts must be ready to attach a level 
of assurance to their analysis.  Intelligence agencies must honestly assess the validity of 
their information.  PSI partners cannot expect all intelligence to be one-hundred percent 




correct, but should expect information sold by the intelligence community as highly 
reliable to be so.   
Third, PSI partners should expect a high level of information sharing within the 
intelligence agencies of established core members.  An initiative, sold internationally as a 
multilateral approach to WMD trafficking, to include established information sharing 
guidelines, must include the best each member’s intelligence assets have to offer.  An 
intelligence assessment offered to PSI decision-makers should be expected to be a 
product of shared information between all parties involved in the planned interdiction.  
PSI interdiction failures do to lack of sharing cannot be tolerated.  Much of the sharing 
burden will be placed on the United States. 
D.   CURRENT SITUATION 
The United States has the most capable intelligence apparatus of any country in 
the world, let alone any PSI participant.  The information produced by the United States 
provides a substantial advantage in understanding world events and making difficult 
decisions.70  Inasmuch as this information is useful to other PSI members, it is not 
surprising that the United States drives the intelligence train for the PSI.  The U.S. 
intelligence community is the backbone of PSI intelligence capabilities; U.S. cooperation 
with other countries and multinational organizations dictates the type and amount of 
intelligence to be shared; and U.S. spokesmen provide the voice of PSI’s intelligence 
sharing efforts. 
1. Bilateral Agreements 
Historically, the United States has been willing to form cooperative agreements 
where it shares common interests and concerns.  Even where the interests of the U.S. and 
another country do not entirely converge, these relationships have proven mutually 
beneficial.  Bilateral cooperation almost always involves sharing intelligence and analysis 
on topics of mutual interest.71   
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U.S. bilateral agreements allow countries without technical capabilities to 
reciprocate in many other ways.  In some cases it is geographical coverage, in some it is 
skill and expertise the U.S. would have to otherwise develop, and in others it is financed 
capabilities that have spared U.S. taxpayers considerable costs.72  Several such 
agreements are listed below.  
 Another country may agree to undertake collection and / or analysis in 
one area and share it with the U.S. in return for U.S. reciprocation in 
another area 
 Another country may permit the U.S. to use its territory for collection 
operations in return for the U.S. sharing the results of such collection 
 The U.S. may help another country acquire a collection capability for 
its own purposes with the understanding that the U.S. will be permitted 
to share in the results 
 Joint collection operations may be undertaken with U.S. intelligence 
officers working side-by-side with their foreign counterparts 
 Exchanges of analysts or technicians between the U.S. and other 
services may occur 
 The U.S. may provide training in return for services rendered by the 
foreign service73 
These bilateral agreements can serve the purpose of U.S. interests, but fall short of the 
PSI information exchange guidelines discussed in Chapter one of this thesis.  These 
bilateral relationships can also be problematic.  At times they necessarily involve 
relationships with governments or individuals with questionable moral or ethical 
standards.  Maintaining relationships with these governments or individuals puts the 
United States at risk of becoming guilty by association.74  
2. Cooperation with Multinational Organizations 
Historically, the United States has been able to share some intelligence or 
information derived from intelligence in multilateral organizations.  For example, 






intelligence is shared with North American Treaty Organization (NATO) member 
countries on a limited and classified basis.75 Sharing information with the UN has been 
more tentative.  The nature of the organization itself, and the lack of an effective system 
to control UN information, puts intelligence sources and related operations at risk.  The 
United States provides the UN with the majority of its information, and other nations 
reportedly contribute very little.76 Multinational organizations do not currently provide 
the PSI with a means of funneling information to core members.  The United States is 
hesitant to utilize the inherent advantages of the multinational organizations, due in large 
part to the secretive nature of U.S. intelligence. 
3.   What is Said vs. What is Done 
At the September 2003 PSI meeting in Paris, PSI participants agreed to general 
guidelines concerning the release, acceptance, and protection of shared information as 
well as feedback on PSI operations fueled by the information.  This agreement appeared 
to signify the dawn of a new era in information sharing.  John Bolton’s public statement 
in a June 2004 interview supports these guidelines:   
Most of the information concerning such (WMD) shipments would of 
necessity come though intelligence sources and methods, which makes 
immediately obvious the need for at least bilateral and frequently 
multilateral government cooperation. Intelligence services, law 
enforcement authorities and even military forces from several 
governments could easily be involved in a single operation.77 
This statement, suggests the PSI is taking major steps in bilateral and multilateral 
intelligence sharing, using all PSI assets, such as Russia, to aid in the effort to interdict 
WMD.  This message may be going out on the news wires, but the U.S. intelligence 
community is not buying in.  
According to an interview conducted with officials at WINPAC, the PSI is not 
intended to be an intelligence sharing forum.  Although the PSI has created interest on 
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policy, U.S. intelligence gathering and sharing operations have not changed.  The PSI 
places the burden on the U.S. and core participants to do their own collection.  There are 
no known PSI collection activities.  Sources at WINPAC explain that although the PSI 
utilizes a multilateral approach, information sharing is still limited.  The United States 
prefers bilateral information sharing, will not explain its capabilities in a large forum, and 
must be careful not to share information that would jeopardize another operation.78  
E.   INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES 
Limitations to intelligence utility, and expectations of PSI partners combine to 
create a rather extensive list of intelligence challenges to PSI’s future success.  Because 
of the predominance of the U.S. intelligence community, these challenges are largely tied 
to U.S. intelligence collection and policies, and can be divided into collecting, sharing, 
trusting, and exercising.  
1.  Collecting  
The prosecution of the Cold War became the defining factor in the development 
of most of the practices of today’s U.S. intelligence community.  The Soviet Union and 
its allies were largely closed targets, forcing U.S. intelligence to rely on a variety of 
largely remote technical systems to collect needed information.  Because the United 
States could not get close to its target, it learned how to achieve its intelligence 
requirements from a distance.79 
The long-distance nature of U.S. intelligence efforts has resulted in over-reliance 
on expensive technical collection systems that are deceptively seductive.  They produce 
mountains of raw data with relatively little manpower, but almost never pinpoint the 
intentions or last-minute strategy shifts provided by human agents.  Additionally, 
experienced and sophisticated foes are developing countermeasures to the collection 
systems.80 When interdicting a shipment in transit, details on the type of cargo, its 
destination, and the intent of its use are critical to making the decision to intercept.  
Satellite imagery or other technical intelligence data may not give decision makers 
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enough clarity to warrant a PSI interdiction.  Technical means of gathering intelligence 
are helpful to PSI operations, but not sufficient by themselves to conquer the PSI task at 
hand. 
Human intelligence sources are needed to augment technical capabilities and 
provide a timely and full assessment that pictures alone cannot give.  A recent 
Congressional report found shortcomings in almost every aspect of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community’s human intelligence collection efforts.  Most knowledgeable observers seem 
to agree that, under the Carter Administration, the United States moved away from 
recruiting human spies and decided to replace them with satellites.81 George Tenet 
recognizes the impact of the lack of human intelligence in Iraq but disagrees with the 
Congressional report’s categorization of the deficiency.  
To be sure, we had difficulty penetrating the Iraqi regime with human 
sources. And I want to be very clear about something: A blanket 
indictment of our human intelligence around the world is dead wrong. We 
have spent the last seven years rebuilding our clandestine service. As 
director of central intelligence, this has been my highest priority.82  
While it may have been Tenet’s highest priority, the lack of direct access of U.S. 
intelligence officials to some sources created misinformation that drove decisions at the 
highest level.  Future misguided PSI interdictions due to poor or non-existent human 
intelligence would likely create doubts internationally, similar to that produced by the 
2003 Iraqi War. 
2.  Sharing 
The United States has spent many years debating and worrying about the clashes 
between democracy and secret intelligence.  While the boundaries of the issue continue to 
be explored, the United States has yet to fully open its doors to the international 
community.83 In the wake of revelations of CIA spying on U.S. citizens, the U.S. 
intelligence community lost some of its ability to operate in the black.  In addition, 
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Senate and House permanent intelligence oversight committees were created, providing 
scrutiny to the U.S. intelligence process.  Despite this scrutiny, exemplified in the Iraqi 
investigation, the secretive nature of U.S. intelligence remains a challenge to PSI 
operations. 
The biggest impediment to PSI information sharing is the human or systematic 
resistance to sharing information.  When including customs and immigration information, 
the U.S. intelligence storehouse is immense.  But the system for processing and using the 
information is weak.  Often, the information is distributed in compartmentalized 
channels, or is available but cannot be shared.  For example, information that would have 
helped identify Nawaf al Hazmi, part of the World Trade Center attack, was available but 
not released because nobody asked for it.84   
What the story of Hazmi and most stories of intelligence sharing have in common 
is a system that requires a demonstrated “need to know” before sharing.  This system 
assumes the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing, and 
also assumes that it is possible to know in advance who needs the information.85 In his 
testimony before a bipartisan commission investigating the 11 September 2001, U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said, “countries were cooperating and sharing 
intelligence, but rules designed to protect sources and methods were making it difficult to 
work together.”86  
One such restriction that affects intelligence sharing within the PSI is known as 
the “third-country rule,” which forbids the country receiving a tip from passing it along to 
anyone else.87 Although this rule is consistent with established PSI information 
guidelines it is only observed by countries possessing large intelligence services.  The 
United States, France, Britain, and Russia observe the rule.  When they share intelligence, 
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it is done on a bilateral basis and tips are often watered-down to protect sources.  
According to Vince Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism chief, “The originator of 
the intelligence controls the dissemination of the intelligence.”88 This is not only the rule, 
but is also problem for countries with limited intelligence gathering capabilities. 
It is in these non-westernized countries that WMD trafficking is most likely to 
occur, and terrorist networks are most likely to strike.  Countries with large intelligence 
services such as Britain and the United States have repeatedly vowed to share 
intelligence, but with one caveat.  British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said his country 
“will continue to share intelligence on a bilateral basis.”89 Bilateral intelligence sharing 
will not cover PSI interdictions in many cases.  The fifteen core PSI members do not 
share common bilateral agreements.  There will be times when interdictions are requested 
or required, and one or more participants in the interdiction are not party to the 
background intelligence.  In addition, necessary background information locked in U.S. 
and European databases could provide necessary tips to PSI participants, but will remain 
undisclosed due to the third-country rule.  Asking states to act, at times with force, 
without disclosing sources and details, requires a great deal of trust in the reliability of 
the intelligence.  In light of recent events, it is questionable that PSI participants would be 
willing to act on U.S. and British intelligence alone without details and confirmation. 
3. Trusting 
In light of intelligence failures in Iraq, U.S. and British intelligence experts 
continue to promote the utility of intelligence.  Lord Charles Powell, the former British 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs accepts that Iraq was a "hard target" and said that in his 
experience:  “intelligence had provided excellent material in conflicts such as the 
Falklands war and during the Cold War.”90 For example, Soviet defector Oleg 
Gordievsky gave the West "monumentally important" information about the Soviet 
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leadership and personally briefed Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan in advance of 
meetings.91   
Despite historical intelligence successes, failures concerning Iraqi WMD have 
issued U.S. and British intelligence services a credibility problem.  Before the war the 
CIA was as sure as intelligence professionals can be that Saddam Hussein possessed 
weapons of mass destruction and was prepared to use them.  That sentiment was shared 
by the intelligence services of Britain, France and other nations.  It dated back to the 
1990s, long before George W. Bush Administration came to Washington. If the CIA and 
other intelligence resources did not get right what they were sure they knew, how can 
they be trusted again?92  The weaknesses revealed in larger intelligence services reflect 
badly on the trust afforded to future assessments.  
Can U.S. and British assessment of a North Korean nuclear program, an Iranian 
nuclear program, or a Syrian chemical weapons program be believed now? The history of 
intelligence is littered with false information, such as Iraq as well as with triumphs such 
as the Cold War.  The difficulty for PSI participants will be in telling which is which.93 
With most intelligence coming from the United States or Britain, PSI participants will be 
required to make decisions regarding the reliability of the intelligence, many times 
without the luxury of details due to third-country rules discussed above.  Interdiction 
activities based on U.S. or British promises, without extensive sharing of intelligence, 
may require a level of trust no longer attached to Western intelligence capabilities.   
4. Exercising  
One mechanism to build needed trust amongst PSI members was supposed to be 
joint interdiction exercises.  Yet, these exercises are plagued with all-too-familiar 
intelligence restrictions.  The U.S. intelligence community has begun practicing 
intelligence sharing in exercises, with the chiefs of station being the main parties of 
exchange.  Because exercise scenarios tend to become highly classified as more real 
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information is shared, exercise scripts have been watered down to protect intelligence 
sources.  These exercises can only prepare for actual interdictions to the extent that 
intelligence services are willing to share threat information.   
According to U.S. Senator Robert Hill in a September 2003 press conference 
concerning Japanese participation in PSI exercises:   
These exercises can help determine whether it is legal to do it and whether 
we would be confident that there would be a sufficient sharing of 
intelligence to ensure that mistakes weren’t made.  So it is a testing 
process and some time in the future after these various exercises have 
taken place a decision will then be made as to whether to bring this 
capability into operational effect.94   
PSI members have yet to solve information sharing problems, and exercises have 
suffered accordingly.  The testing process is only as useful as the concepts and 
capabilities tested.  When protecting information or sources outweighs the need to 
practice with full capabilities, PSI participants may ultimately be caught off-guard when 
the real thing takes place. 
F. OVERCOMING INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES 
The importance of safe-guarding information and controlling its distribution is 
likely to relegate PSI intelligence sharing to status quo bilateral agreements.  Formalizing 
these agreements and adding new bilateral agreements among PSI participants would 
help, but would not fully address intelligence challenges.  Fully addressing these 
challenges would necessitate a revolutionary approach to intelligence sharing. The 
current U.S. intelligence sharing structure is a hub-and-spoke system, where each agency 
has its own database.  Agencies send information into this database and then can retrieve 
it.    A new concept for information sharing is already being widely discussed throughout 
the U.S. government.  This concept, a trusted information network, is a decentralized 
approach to information sharing.  According to the 9 / 11 Commission, under this 
concept,  
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Agencies would still have their own databases, but those databases would 
be searchable across agency lines.  In this system, secrets are protected 
through the design of the network and an “information rights 
management” approach that controls access to data, not access to the 
whole network.95 
The technology needed to adopt such a concept exists, but presidential support and 
leadership is still needed.  Policy and legal issues are harder than the technical ones, and 
dictate a governing body ready and willing to enforce network restrictions and punish 
violators.96 
 Adoption of a similar trusted information network for the PSI is worth 
considering.  First, the network would maximize collection capabilities by combining 
available technical data with human intelligence from PSI collectors across the globe.  
Second, the network would facilitate a high degree of intelligence sharing among PSI 
partners, widening sharing from a bilateral to a multilateral basis.  Third, the network 
would inherently build trust in the intelligence shared through it.  Finally, this network 
would be an integral part of PSI exercises and training, thus allowing PSI partners to have 
a consistent mechanism for sharing intelligence.   
 A trusted information network would require a governing body responsible for the 
planning, resources, and enforcement of information sharing guidelines.  According to 
the 9 / 11 Commission, NATO might fill that square.  The commission’s report says:  
“The PSI can be more effective if it uses intelligence and planning resources of the 
NATO alliance.”97  A NATO trusted information network structure would require it to 
evolve beyond a traditional security alliance to keep pace with the evolving threat 
environment.  During the June 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO leaders took a step in the 
right direction with an agreement to improve intelligence sharing among members.  Per 
the summit agreement, the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, created after the September 
11 attacks, will be the permanent body under which this intelligence sharing takes 
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place.98  A NATO-administered trusted information network would require the insertion 
of an additional article into the North Atlantic Charter, formalizing intelligence and law 
enforcement cooperation as well as institutionalizing cooperation and intelligence-
sharing.99   
 To build trust in the network, breaches of established information sharing 
procedures would need to be dealt with immediately and severely, to include removal 
from the network for violations.  A punitive system for violators would likely be 
necessary stipulation to U.S. Intelligence Community acceptance.  This would necessitate 
a revolutionary role for NATO.  A NATO structure for intelligence sharing would need 
to address the inclusive nature of its membership.  Some PSI partners are not part of 
NATO.  Sharing with these countries, which includes Russia, would most likely require a 
separate structure, acceptance into the network, or additions to the NATO alliance.  A 
PSI-specific trusted information network could be an extension of the NATO structure or 
a second generation structure of the NATO network. 
G.  CONCLUSION 
As PSI participants exercise multilateral interdiction of WMD materials, the role 
of timely and actionable intelligence cannot be discounted.  Although intelligence does 
not represent the truth, it does provide a proximate reality that is invaluable to operations 
involving WMD.  Sharing this intelligence in a multilateral forum is one of the PSI’s 
prescribed advantages.  This advantage appears to be confined to news reports and 
official statements.  The United States and other PSI partner have yet to change their 
intelligence sharing practices in order to conform to PSI information sharing guidelines.  
A change, in the form of an internationally recognized trusted information network would 
minimize intelligence challenges that PSI participants are likely to face in the future. 
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 10 December 2002, in the Indian Ocean, Spanish forces acting in concert with 
the United States, seized a North Korean cargo ship bound for Yemen, carrying fifteen 
SCUD missiles and fifteen conventional warheads.100  The next day Spanish forces 
watched in dismay when U.S. officials allowed the ship to sail away due to legal 
constraints.101  Ten months later a U.S.-led naval operation interdicted a shipment of 
thousands of uranium-centrifuge parts bound for Libya.  Fortunately for American and 
British officials, there were no legal stipulations this time, and the nuclear weapons-
related materials did not reach Libyan soil.  The legal interception of the German-owned 
ship marked a turning point in negotiations with Libya, which two months later 
announced it would halt its WMD program.102 After the interdiction, President Bush 
announced his intention to make the PSI a step towards “new legal agreements 
authorizing the search of planes and ships carrying cargo.”103  
Ostensibly the PSI helped clear legal hurdles in the Libyan case that doomed the 
North Korean interdiction to failure.  Upon closer investigation, the legality of the Libyan 
interdiction was more a factor of the countries involved than any special legal authority 
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given the PSI.  Having announced that the early stages of the PSI will likely be focused 
on shipments by sea, PSI participants are currently fielding questions regarding the legal 
authority to search and seize international vessels on the high seas or territorial waters.  
This chapter asks the question:  What are the legal challenges to future PSI success and 
how can they be overcome? 
This chapter utilizes the North Korean and Libyan examples as stage setters for 
the importance of legality involving interdiction operations.  First, I examine existing 
laws pertaining to interdiction, with emphasis on interdiction at sea.  Next, I consider 
how the PSI is currently conducting business from a legal standpoint, and the challenges 
to that conduct.  I end the chapter with a summary of prospective approaches to overcome 
these legal challenges.  Because of the number of variables involved:  WMD, 
interdiction, sovereignty, international institutions, self-defense, and current international 
law, the legality of PSI operations is complex.  In this thesis chapter, I conclude that until 
the PSI falls fully under the auspices of an internationally recognized justification, such 
as a PSI-specific UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), legal constraints will 
continue to plague the initiative.  
B.   IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 
The results of the North Korean and Libyan interdictions differed due to the legal 
justification for seizing the respective cargo.  Although both vessels carried cargo that 
could be utilized for WMD purposes, the North Korean cargo ship was allowed to sail 
away with its cargo intact. 
1. One That Got Away  
Under the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, discussed below, vessels on the 
high seas can be stopped by ships of their flag state.  Also, if a ship is not flying a flag 
and does not demonstrate its state of registration, it can be stopped.  Because the North 
Korean ship, So San, flew no flag, it was subject to inspection.  Nevertheless, the cargo 
was not illegal under international law.  International law does not prohibit free passage 
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of nuclear weapons and WMD materials unless proven to be heading into the hands of 
terrorists.104   
At the time of interdiction, North Korea was party to the NPT, but not the Missile 
Technology Control Group, and had the right to transfer the SCUDs.   The recipient of 
the cargo was a nation-state, Yemen, and intent to distribute the weapons to terrorists 
could not be proven.  North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT became effective on 10 
April 2003.  Were a North Korean ship carrying nuclear weapons stopped today, current 
international law again might not give the interdictors sufficient legal justification to act 
against the North Koreans.105 
2. One that Did Not Get Away  
While successful, the PSI interdiction of cargo bound for Libya underscored the 
limitations of any interdiction initiative.  Because the ship carrying the centrifuges was 
German-owned, and Germany is a PSI participant, Berlin was able to ask the shipping 
company to take its cargo to an Italian port for voluntary inspection.  Had the ship been 
registered to a non-PSI participant or an uncooperative government, and not passed 
through the territorial waters of a PSI participant, the opportunity to search and seize the 
cargo may not have arisen.106  In addition, unlike North Korea, Libya ratified the NPT in 
1975 and was subject to the terms of the treaty, including the agreement not to pursue 
nuclear components for weapons use. 
3. Bottom Line 
When comparing the two cases it is apparent that legal justification will continue 
to play a major role in the success or failure of interdiction activities.  Expanded 
membership in the PSI will be critical to the legal success of the initiative. 
C. RELEVANT EXISTING LAW AND EXPECTATIONS  
The PSI participants and interdiction principles covered in chapter one are two of 
the three variables in determining the legality of interdictions on land, at sea, and in the 
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air. The third factor is the existing laws covering those interdictions.  Currently there in 
no blanket authority enabling PSI participants to seize WMD in transit.  Thus far, PSI 
proponents have relied on a number of laws and treaties that do not directly address 
interdiction of WMD.  The United States has also enforced its applicable domestic legal 
authorities when appropriate. 
1. Article 51 of the UN Charter   
International laws pertaining to self-defense may also apply to the legality of 
interdiction operations.  Article 51 of the UN Charter states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.  Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.107 
While PSI proponents have argued for the applicability of Article 51 as legal justification 
for interdiction of WMD, the language of the article is not specific to PSI-like activities.  
It only allows an action of self-defense when an armed attack occurs, and in an interim 
period, until the UN Security Council takes necessary measures.  This article does not 
provide inherent support for on-going international interdiction operations outside the 
bounds of the UN Security Council.108   
2. UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 1992   
One form of statement issued by the UN Security Council is a presidential 
statement.  The Security Council has never defined the scope, content, or nature of 
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presidential statements, and they should not be interpreted as creating the same legal 
obligations as resolutions.109  The 1992 UN Security Council Security Statement states: 
The members of the Council underline the need for all Member states to 
fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to 
prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass 
destruction; to avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations and 
transfer of arms; and to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter 
any problems concerning these matters threatening or disrupting the 
maintenance of regional or global stability.  They emphasize the 
importance of regional and global arms control agreements, especially the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).110 
It goes on to state: 
The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.  The members of the Council commit 
themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the 
research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action 
to that end.111 
Problematic to the applicability of this article to PSI is the lack of specific mention of 
interdiction or in-transit actions against proliferators.  The emphasis placed on the current 
treaty-based nonproliferation regime and on a multilateral organizational approach to 
stopping proliferation is not necessarily applicable to the PSI. 
3.   UNSCR 1540 
On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which 
affirms that “proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their 
means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”112  The 
resolution goes on to state that the UN is gravely concerned by the threat of illicit 
trafficking of WMD, and asks nation-states to adopt and enforce effective laws which 
prohibit any non-state actor from acquiring, transporting, or transferring WMD or their 
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means of delivery.  Paragraph 10 of the resolution calls upon all states “in accordance 
with their national legal authorities and consistent with international law, to take 
cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.”113 
According to officials within OSD, specific language regarding PSI was 
originally part of the resolution, but was removed at the urging of China.114  While 
Resolution 1540 does not specifically justify PSI interdictions, it does acknowledge the 
need for better legal and regulatory frameworks to prevent illicit trafficking to non-state 
actors, and in that sense supports the underlying rationale for the PSI. 
4. Sea - LOS Convention 
The possible obstacle to interdiction activities on the high seas may be the 1982 
United Nations (UN) International LOS Convention, which gives ships the rights of 
freedom of the seas and innocent passage.  These rights are essential to global commerce, 
ensuring that shipments are not cut off.115 According to Devon Chafee, research and 
advocacy coordinator for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 
The LOS Convention is one of the most comprehensive and well-
established bodies of international regulatory norms in existence.  It is 
buttressed by longstanding international norms, and formal legal 
agreements critical to creating a more secure international environment.116 
Nearly a decade after the last time it surfaced in the United States, the LOS 
Convention is again on the U.S. Senate table moving toward ratification, thanks in large 
to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar.117 Lugar recently 
wrote a letter to all senators stating that the president strongly supports ratification of the 
LOS Convention, adding:  
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Some misinformed commentators have erroneously asserted that the 
Convention's rules would prohibit the sort of at-sea interdiction operations 
that are central to President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative, which 
is designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and missile technology. Nothing could be further from the truth. ... In fact, 
the Convention strengthens PSI.118 
The perceived strengthening of the PSI by ratifying the LOS Convention would include 
reassurance to other countries that the PSI will align itself with legal authorities, and not 
operate outside the bounds of customary international law. 
Several European allies agreeing with Lugar say the treaty provides an 
international legal framework for the PSI, and have warned the United States that the PSI 
could suffer if the United States doesn't ratify the LOS Convention before the end of the 
year.  At least one ally, the Netherlands, has threatened to reduce its support for the 
initiative if the sea treaty, ratified by more than 140 countries, is not ratified.  The United 
States, the catalyst for the PSI, is the only country participating in the initiative that has 
not ratified the sea treaty.119  Conservatives in the U.S. Congress contend the treaty, 
supported in the Pentagon, by industry, and by environmental leaders, will undermine 
U.S. sovereignty.120  
Even if ratified, there is nothing in the LOS Convention that explicitly prohibits 
transit of WMD or gives nation-states the right to interdict such transit.  On the contrary, 
a number of states, including the United States, have actively opposed the development 
of such prohibitive norms or interpretations of international law that would prohibit the 
transit of WMD by seas or air, and cite the rights and privileges established in the LOS 
Convention to affirm their unhindered military use of the oceans.121 
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a. High Seas 
The high seas include all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state.  The freedom of the high seas is an 
ancient right tied to global commerce, and one that wealthy trading states like the United 
States and Britain do not want to undermine.  A ship on the high seas is subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the country whose flag it flies.  The flag state does have the right 
to give the United States or its allies the right to stop and search a ship flying its flag.  
Limitations to the freedom of the high seas include piracy, slave trade, unauthorized 
broadcasting, and drug trafficking.  Again, there is no mention of restrictions to the 
shipment of missiles or WMD-related materials.122 
b. Territorial Waters 
States have the jurisdiction to prescribe law within the territory that 
extends 12 nautical miles from the shoreline, meaning a state can theoretically set the 
rules for interdiction in this area.  Yet, states have recognized the right to free passage in 
this area for such a long period of time that it became part of the customary international 
law that was codified in the LOS Convention.  Article 19 of the LOS Convention 
documents this right to free passage as long as the ship passing through is not deemed 
prejudicial to peace, good order, or security; and then lists the ways in which passage 
might be denied.  Transport of missiles or WMD components is not mentioned in the list, 
nor can it be asserted that it fits into any of the prohibited activities.123  Article 23 of the 
LOS Convention explicitly gives the right of free passage to states carrying nuclear 
weapons.  This article was clearly drafted by existing nuclear powers to enable port calls 
by nuclear-armed naval ships.  It is only in the case of shipments that are intended for 
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5.   Land – State Territory 
Within the territory of a state, complete jurisdiction is allotted to that state to both 
legislate and enforce.  Interdiction operations on the state’s land require national laws, 
and would be enforceable upon any vessel and to any state or foreign national involved in 
a transaction.  Properly constructed, national laws could legitimize PSI-related land 
interdictions within the boundaries of the acting state’s territory.125 
6.   Air Space – Chicago Convention 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 
December 1944, remains the most completely recognized piece of international law 
regarding air transit.  According to the convention, every nation-state has complete 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, which is deemed to be the land 
areas and territorial waters adjacent to and under the protection or mandate of such 
state.126  Under Article 35 of the convention states may deny access to their airspace to 
aircraft carrying “munitions or implements of war” and may regulate or prohibit carriage 
of other articles “for reasons of public order and safety.”127  
Although denial of airspace access under the Chicago Convention is allotted for 
reasons consistent with thwarting the transit of WMD, there is no explicit mentioning of 
interdiction.  Additionally, denial of air transit in international airspace is not covered by 
this or any other internationally recognized law or treaty. 
7. U.S. Legal Authorities 
The United States itself currently has substantial domestic legal authorities to 
interdict the transfer of WMD, missiles, and related materials.  These authorities fall into 
the categories of imports of items into the United States, exports of items from the United 
States, transit / transshipment of items in U.S. waters or U.S. airspace, and transport of 
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items on the high seas / in international airspace.  These authorities are exercised 
consistent with U.S. ratified treaties and customary international law.128 
a. Import Items into the United States 
U.S. customs authorities have the power to inspect, detain, or seize any 
cargo brought into the United States when there is probable cause that it is being 
imported contrary to U.S. law.  Items that violate U.S. law may include:  items prohibited 
in the United States, items lacking licensing, items with false documentation, or items 
that can be used to further terrorist or criminal acts.  U.S. customs laws are generally 
broad enough to seize most if not all items that are of proliferation concern.129   
b. Exports of Items from the United States 
U.S. export control authorities have the power to prevent WMD and 
related material from being U.S. exports.  Licensing requirements on export items to most 
destinations, including licensing of any dual-use item, is the biggest deterrent to 
exporting proliferation materials from the United States.  The United States also holds the 
rights to stop, inspect, and seize any cargo that could be WMD-related.130   
c. Transit / Transshipment of Items in U.S. Waters or U.S. Airspace 
The issue of inspection or interdiction of items in transit within U.S. 
waters or airspace is a bit more complex, but generally follows the same rule of law as 
imports and exports.  Under U.S. law, the transit or transshipment of WMD-related 
materials is considered an import when items enter U.S. territorial seas or airspace, and 
an export when they leave U.S. territorial seas or airspace.  When a foreign-flag vessel 
traverses the U.S. territorial sea without entering into internal waters or a port facility, the 
LOS Convention takes precedence.  Thus, passage is legal as long as it is not prejudicial 
to peace or good order and security, as noted above.   Consistent with the Chicago 
Convention, the United States may apply customs and export control laws on an aircraft 
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transiting U.S. airspace even if it is not scheduled to land or unload cargo in the United 
States.131 
d. Transport of Items on the High Seas / in International Airspace 
The U.S. government has broad authority to stop, board, search, and seize 
cargo on the high seas when the vessel is U.S.-flagged and in violation of U.S. law.  This 
statutory authority does not generally pertain to foreign-flagged vessels trafficking on the 
high seas.  Barring explicit permission or hot pursuit from U.S. territory, the U.S. has no 
standing legal authority to stop and board the vessel.  The same principle applies to 
interdiction of foreign registered aircraft flying in international airspace.132 
8. Legal Expectations 
Legal expectations must start with avoidance of situations such as the one 
involving the So San.  When the decision to interdict a shipment has been made, PSI 
partners must ensure legal justification exists for stopping, searching, seizing, or 
destroying the vessel or materials on-board.  PSI legal expectations will grow as 
international support for the initiative grows, and corresponding international laws and 
resolutions are enacted.  As the rest of this chapter explains, PSI partners cannot be 
expected to legally interdict all WMD shipments until an umbrella justification exists for 
these interdictions.   
D. CURRENT SITUATION 
The PSI does not empower participants to do anything they previously could not 
do, nor does it grant governments any new legal authority to conduct interdictions in 
international waters or airspace.133  Because PSI members are most familiar with 
maritime interdiction, current efforts to bolster PSI’s legal authority have centered on sea 
law.  Speaking to the Federalist Society in November of 2003, John Bolton, U.S. 
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security said this of PSI’s 
legitimacy: “where there are gaps or ambiguities in our authorities, we may consider 
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seeking additional sources for such authority, as circumstances dictate.”134 To date, the 
United States and fellow PSI participants have identified authorization to search and seize 
on the sea in three cases:  1) when ships do not display a nation’s flag, effectively 
becoming pirate ships; 2) when ships use a “flag of convenience” and the nation chosen 
gives PSI participants permission; and 3) when there is a serious belief the vessel is 
carrying WMD, invoking a right to self-defense, or prevention of WMD proliferation.135 
1. No Flag 
It is consider impolite in international shipping circles, to sail on the high seas in 
ghost or pirate vessels, without a flag, flaunting a false cargo manifest.  Given the 
underhanded mode of transportation, the cargo and vessel could be subject to forfeiture 
under the doctrine of piracy and prize.136  According to John Bolton, “vessels on the high 
seas may, under well-accepted principles of customary international usage, be boarded by 
any navy if they do not fly colors or show proper identification.”137 The lack of an 
identify flag is justification enough for PSI interdictions to board suspect vessels. 
2. Governmental Permission  
As noted above, rationale for search and seizure under the LOS Convention 
includes permission from the government whose flag the ship is flying. Working within 
the confines of the LOS Convention, PSI participants are orchestrating deals with 
supporting countries and other participants to allow such legal search and seizure.  For 
example, the United States signed a boarding agreement with Liberia on 11 February 
2004 that allows vessels suspected of transporting dangerous arms to be stopped and 
searched by the other’s military and law enforcement agencies.  This agreement includes 
boarding on a case-by-case basis, but if a specific request is not responded to within a 
two-hour period, it will be treated as consent to act.  The value of this agreement is 
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underscored by the fact that approximately 1,500 oceangoing ships are registered to 
Liberia, second only to Panama’s 5,000.138  
On 12 May 2004, the United States and Panama signed a reciprocal maritime ship 
boarding agreement that facilitates cooperation between the United States and Panama to 
prevent shipments by sea of WMD and their delivery systems or related materials by 
establishing procedures to board and search vessels in international waters suspected of 
carrying such items.139 Given that together, Panama and Liberia account for roughly 
thirty percent of the world’s commercial shipping tonnage, the ship boarding agreements 
will ease some of PSI’s legal concerns on the high seas.140 The U.S. Department of State 
spokesman continues to pursue as much as ten additional states about concluding similar 
boarding arrangements.141 
3. Right to Self-Defense / Stop Proliferation 
The United States and fellow PSI participants have invoked Article 51 of the UN 
Charter as a legal basis for interdiction activities.  For example, if the United States knew 
that a North Korean ship was carrying WMD-related materials outside the country, it 
would simply stop it, justifying the action as self-defense, given North Korea’s history of 
exporting to rouge states and non-state actors.142 This claim is controversial and not fully 
accepted as a legal basis for interdiction, a situation discussed in the next section. 
In addition, the U.S. State Department believes that the PSI is consistent with, and 
a step in the implementation of, the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 1992.  
State Department officials have added that the PSI supports the need for more coherent 
and concerted efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related 
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materials.143 The applicability of the 1992 statement to the PSI is one of many legal 
challenges currently facing the initiative. 
E. LEGAL CHALLENGES 
While PSI participants have conducted thorough reviews and repeatedly stress 
that PSI interdiction efforts are grounded in existing domestic and international 
authorities, the verification of legal grounding remains a challenge.144 International 
authority vested in the LOS Convention and UN documentation does not fully support 
PSI activities, and domestic authorization can only be applied on a case-by-case basis.  
1. Interdiction Principles Not Covered by LOS Convention   
PSI interdiction principles include taking action on cargoes of WMD and related 
materials consistent with international laws.  The trouble with this principle is that 
international laws do not specifically cover interdiction of WMD on the high seas or in 
territorial waters.  Justification for naval interception on the high seas is difficult to 
acquire because all states enjoy freedom of the high seas in accordance with the LOS 
Convention.  Limitations to the freedom of the high seas do not include restrictions to the 
shipment of missiles or WMD-related materials.  Noting this fact at the second PSI 
meeting, the Australian Foreign Minister said, “it was more likely that the short-term 
efforts would be confined to PSI member states’ territorial waters.”145   
Efforts to justify PSI activities in territorial waters also lack significant support 
from the LOS Convention.  Article 19 (which lists free passage restrictions) of the LOS 
Convention does not restrict free passage of WMD-related materials in territorial waters.  
Additionally, Article 23 explicitly mentions the right of innocent passage to states 
carrying nuclear weapons.  It would be difficult for PSI participants to inspect suspect 
shipments in territorial waters as long as the intention of the passage is innocent.  Thus, 
unless suspect shipments are clearly determined to be intended for terrorists, the right of 
passage provisions in the LOS Convention gives opponents of the PSI powerful legal 
ammunition.   
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2. Applicability of UN Documents  
U.S. assertions of PSI interdiction justification through Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, UNSCR 1540, and the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 1992 
remain sketchy at best.  The language of Article 51 only allows an action of self-defense 
when an armed attack occurs, and in an interim period until the UN Security Council 
takes necessary measures.  This article does not provide inherent support for on-going 
international interdiction operations outside the bounds of the UN Security Council.  The 
fact that the PSI has yet to define the standard of proof necessary for interdiction 
activities, coupled with the current climate of distrust toward American intelligence, 
makes the self-defense argument harder to use as legal justification.146  
UNSCR 1540 does acknowledge the need for better legal and regulatory 
frameworks to prevent illicit trafficking to non-state actors, and hints at cooperative 
actions to stop proliferators, but does not provide a legal basis for interdictions by PSI 
partners.  Specific language regarding interdictions and use of force against WMD 
traffickers must accompany any resolution for it to meet the purpose of PSI operations.  
Its applicability is limited by the removal of PSI-specific interdiction language by 
Chinese officials. 
Even if a presidential statement represented a formal legal effect not yet stipulated 
by the Security Council, the question remains as to its applicability toward interdiction on 
the high seas.  The argument is not convincing that the 1992 statement changes any 
international law on freedom of navigation or empowers interdiction of WMD shipments 
under the PSI.  Minus an authorization from the UN Security Council, confirming the 
applicability of the 1992 statement to the PSI, it cannot be considered germane to 
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F. OVERCOMING LEGAL CHALLENGES 
1.  Overcoming the LOS Convention Challenge  
Because the LOS Convention does not explicitly prohibit the transit of WMD, PSI 
interdictions are not legally covered.  To overcome this challenge, PSI partners can either 
operate outside the bounds of the convention, or seek to add specific WMD interdiction 
language to the convention.  The prospects of each of these approaches are discussed 
below.  
a. Operating Outside the LOS Convention (Positive Outlook) 
The likelihood that the United States and other PSI participants would 
continue to develop an interdiction strategy outside of international law is reinforced by 
the current U.S. trend towards dismantling norms that discourage the U.S. exercise of 
military power.  U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, abandonment of 
START II, failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and stalled efforts to 
improve the Biological Weapons Convention indicate a movement away from 
multilateral nonproliferation solutions.148 By developing PSI norms outside international 
law, the hope would be that the practice would become customary international law over 
time.  Ruth Wedgwood, an international scholar close to the members of the Bush 
Administration, used this analogy an April 2003 Wall Street Journal article: 
The United States should interdict North Korean ships based on the same 
rational that Britain used to intercept slave ships.  Britain needed no 
justification beyond a moral one.149 
Customary international law can change as states begin to feel compelled 
to avoid certain actions.  Continued interdiction of WMD materials, designed to keep 
these materials out of the hands of those likely to use the WMD, might be enough to 
compel a change of customary law. 
b. Operating Outside the LOS Convention (Negative Outlook) 
If PSI participants attempt to exchange LOS Convention norms for 
selective nonproliferation activities, they could eventually restrict their own country’s 
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access to international waters.150  Erosion of the LOS Convention laws to suit the PSI is 
not likely to happen quickly enough to serve the PSI’s purposes.  Furthermore, even if a 
norm against trafficking WMD becomes internationally recognized, it is another matter to 
assert a right to interdict based on that norm.151 
c. Changing the LOS or Creating a New Treaty (Positive Outlook)  
 PSI participants could put forward a new treaty or protocol to the LOS 
Convention itself.  Doing so could alter the right innocent passage verbiage to include all 
cargos suspected to contain materials related to WMD.  This would give PSI participants 
internationally recognized justification for interdiction activities. 
d. Changing LOS or Creating a New Treaty (Negative Outlook) 
This approach faces three problems, the first being time.  The LOS 
Convention took decades to write.  Changing it would likely take years, which is too long 
for the PSI’s purposes.  Second, even if the treaty were broadly signed and ratified, 
countries such as North Korea would not become party to the treaty.  Third, altering a 
treaty cannot itself authorize interdiction of weapons shipments.  While pushing a PSI 
resolution at NPT and CWC review conferences that would declare shipments 
inconsistent with the treaties might be another avenue PSI partners should pursue.  These 
still wouldn’t apply to non-parties, and might be vetoed by other signatories.  
Justification for interdiction would likely take a UN Security Council resolution.152  
2. Overcoming the UN Applicability Challenge  
While UNSCR 1540 acknowledges the need for better legal and regulatory 
frameworks to prevent illicit trafficking to non-state actors, it does specifically add legal 
justification for PSI interdictions.  A UN Security Council Resolution authorizing these 
interdictions would provide blanket legal authority for the PSI.  Positive and negative 
outlooks of this occurrence are described below. 
 
 
                                                 
 
150 Chaffee, “Freedom or Force on the High Seas? “ 
151 Friedman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative:  The Legal Challenge,” 5. 
152 Ibid., 7. 
 54
 a. PSI UN Security Council Resolution (Positive Outlook) 
The most effective means to justify PSI activities would be a UN Security 
Council resolution authorizing interdiction.  A Security Council resolution would trump 
existing treaty limitations and give PSI participants the legal justification they need.153 
U.S. diplomats understand the power of a resolution and are currently pressing the 
Security Council to endorse a draft resolution that would allow the “use of force against 
entities and individuals suspected of trying to develop, possess or transfer WMD.”154 
Washington officials are seeking Security Council approval under chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter, which binds states to implement Council decisions.155 Even Security Council 
resolution aimed specifically at interdicting North Korean shipments might give PSI 
participants much of the justification they need to interdict.  According to Don Rothwell, 
an international law expert at the University of Sydney: 
The easiest way for the PSI nations to get around international law is for 
the Security Council to make a resolution aimed at North Korea.  Such an 
interdiction resolution was in place for 12 years against Iraq after the 1991 
Gulf War.156 
On 13 November 2003, John Bolton affirmed he and other PSI 
participants doubted that only the Security Council could grant the authority PSI 
needs.157 Yet, it appears today that the Security Council remains PSI’s best bet for 
internationally recognized interdiction justification. 
b. PSI UN Security Council Resolution (Negative Outlook) 
John Burroughs, executive director of the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear 
Policy, a U.S.-based non-profit disarmament advocacy group argues that there is nothing 
in the UN Charter that gives the Security Council the authority to adopt global legislation 
for WMD interdiction.  In addition, many Security Council members fear a resolution 
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would give Washington a free hand to unilaterally deal with the as yet undefined entities 
and individuals.  Past negotiations have stalled because of two of five permanent Council 
members, China and Russia.  With Russia now a core PSI member, China continues to 
stall the progress of a PSI resolution, as evidenced by their removal of specific PSI 
language from UNSCR 1540.   
G. CONCLUSION 
Given the difficulties of operations outside the LOS Convention, the time needed 
to change or create a new treaty, and the suspect legitimacy of new customary laws, the 
best chance for the across-the-board PSI legal legitimacy is by adopting specific PSI 
provisions within the existing treaty-based nonproliferation regime.  A PSI-specific UN 
Security Resolution would be the most effective legal umbrella.  A key to passing such an 
initiative would be Chinese support of PSI interdiction principles.  Chinese, along with 
the now promised Russian support of PSI interdiction principles, would allow the 
initiative to balance its individual strengths with internationally recognized justification 
through the UN Security Council.  Without support from China and Russia on the 
council, a WMD interdiction resolution will never be passed.   The lack of a PSI-specific 
Security Council resolution will rest the initiative’s legal hopes on individual deals and 
non-binding documents that do not explicitly address interdiction activities.  If PSI’s 
legal argument does not become stronger, participants in the initiative will once again 
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IV.  OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Interdiction operations are not a new response to the proliferation challenge.   
These operations have taken place many times before, but they were focused on items 
before they leave cargo holds in airports, seaports, or warehouses.  Proliferators are now 
increasingly using sophisticated and aggressive techniques to circumvent export controls, 
and are employing brokers or middlemen to receive and re-export items to their final 
destination.158  These new techniques require a strengthening of national export control 
systems and widening the spectrum of WMD interdiction to include in-transit intercepts.  
By focusing on this in-transit phase, the PSI provides a second line of defense to export 
control systems.   
The previous chapters of this thesis examine the intelligence and legal challenges 
to successful interdictions.  Once actionable intelligence is received and legal hurdles are 
cleared, the work of PSI participants is only beginning.  The operational aspect of the PSI 
is not without its own challenges.  This thesis chapter examines the operational 
challenges to future PSI success and considers how they can be overcome.  I first 
consider the guidelines for PSI interdiction operations, progress made in adhering to 
these guidelines, and expectations for future PSI operations.  Second, I address the 
operational capabilities of PSI partners, and the results and effectiveness of joint PSI 
exercises.  These exercises address some of the challenges to PSI operations.  In the third 
section of this chapter I review these challenges, which include:  interoperability, WMD 
detection, and use of force during air-intercepts.  In the final section of this chapter, I 
prescribe a team approach to PSI interoperability, improvements in detection technology 
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B. GUIDELINES AND EXPECTATIONS 
Most PSI intercepts will closely resemble the law enforcement model utilized in 
stopping in-transit drug smuggling.  This model emphasizes coalition building and 
community action to intercept illegal drugs.  The PSI is following the same type of 
model, first building international support for the initiative, then relying on the joint 
abilities of the nonproliferation community to take action on illegal shipments of nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons and materials.  The ability to take action is the 
cornerstone of future expectations for PSI operations.  As noted in chapter one, effective 
action does not always include military involvement. 
According to the U.S. Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, “Interdiction is 
an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before 
it can be used effectively against friendly forces.”159 The PSI, a multi-national effort 
designed to cut off or prohibit land, sea, and air trafficking of WMD, operates under the 
auspices of this definition.  First, the PSI uses the strength of multilateral partnerships to 
make trafficking of WMD a politically risky venture.  Second, the PSI disrupts supply 
lines and channels target movements into easier to manage areas.  Finally, the PSI 
combines capabilities of several members to stop vessels and conduct search, seizure, or 
other military operations.  The law enforcement model, PSI interdiction principles, 
progress thus far, and future expectations are discussed below.  
1. Law Enforcement Model 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) mission is to eliminate the supply 
of drugs in America through law enforcement.  The DEA works together with target 
communities that are willing and able to commit to long-term solutions to immediate 
drug-trafficking problems.  With DEA leadership, other federal agencies are called to the 
table in an effort to broaden the resources available to the community.160  While each 
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community is unique, there are several common elements, including identification 
procedures and execution of enforcement operations (see figure 4).161  
  
Figure 4.   How the IDEA Works, from WWW.DEA.GOV162 
 
The PSI plan of attack closely resembles that of the DEA.  First, PSI participants 
built coalition support for the initiative through acceptance of a norm against the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials.  Next, 
participants formally identified the problem in a ratified UN Security Council Resolution.  
Now PSI members are refining the solution through exercises and training, and launching 
multilateral interdiction activities designed to bring long term solutions to the WMD 
trafficking problem.  The international community approach for PSI is tied to the 
acceptance by over sixty countries of the initiative’s interdiction principles, established in 
September 2003. 
2. PSI Interdiction Principles and Progress 
PSI interdiction principles call upon participants to:  “take specific actions to 
support interdiction of cargoes of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials 
consistent with national and international laws, including not transporting such cargoes, 
boarding and searching vessels flying flags that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 





cargoes, allowing authorities from other states to stop and search vessels in international 
waters, interdicting aircraft transiting sovereign airspace that are suspected of carrying 
prohibited cargoes, and inspecting all types of transportation vehicles using ports, 
airfields, or other facilities for the transshipment of prohibited cargoes.”163 Breaking this 
principle down, the PSI asks its participants to support interdiction of WMD, stop and 
search suspect vessels, and perform military action if needed. 
a. International Support 
 PSI core members, with strong support from the George W. Bush 
Administration, pushed a resolution through the United Nations in April of 2004 that 
endorsed important principles of the PSI.  UN Security Council Resolution 1540 affirms 
that proliferation of WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and 
asks nation-states to adopt and enforce effective laws, and take cooperative action to 
prohibit any non-state actor from acquiring, transporting, or transferring WMD or their 
means of delivery.164 Through this and other multilateral agreements to stop WMD 
shipments, the PSI is beginning to foster a multinational norm.   
Over sixty countries now support PSI interdiction principles.  This international 
support triggers deterrence by denial.  The threat that a shipment will be stopped and 
potentially seized should act as a deterrent to potential WMD suppliers and recipients.  
For suppliers, seizure could lead to embarrassing exposure with the possibility of 
political, economic, or military sanctions by PSI member states.  For recipients, 
interdiction risks exposing what in most cases are covert programs to build a secret 
WMD capability.  This exposure could trigger responses from a variety international 
organizations and state actors, to include inspections, sanctions, or military action.165   
b. Right This Way Please 
 Interdiction can be an effective means of channeling a proliferator’s 
movement, forcing the enemy to maneuver through or along predictable avenues.  The 
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PSI uses its international support mechanisms to funnel illegal transit into more 
predictable routes.  The United States signed boarding agreements with Liberia and 
Panama in early 2004 that allow vessels suspected of transporting dangerous arms to be 
stopped and searched by the other’s military and law enforcement agencies.  Given that 
together, Panama and Liberia account for roughly thirty percent of the world’s 
commercial shipping tonnage, the ship boarding agreements deter would-be proliferators 
from using these vessels or routes of transit.166 Because proliferators are now aware that 
justification for interdiction activities exists aboard these vessels, they are less likely to 
use them.  This leaves the intelligence community with a smaller area in which to collect, 
and the operational community with a smaller area to search.  With more PSI agreements 
unfolding each month, proliferators will find it harder to find routes of safe passage, and 
PSI participants will find it easier to predict which routes and means of transit the 
proliferators will use. 
c. Stop, Search and Seize 
 When proliferators are stopped and searched, the combined capabilities of 
multinational PSI partners make intercepts of WMD more likely.  An important, publicly 
announced intercept in October 2003 involved the BBC China, a German-owned ship, 
tracked from Dubai, and bound for Libya.  Five containers, each forty feet in length, 
listed on the ship’s manifest as full of used machine parts, were found to contain 
sophisticated centrifuges used in the development of nuclear weapons.  While this 
incident displays the promise of the PSI, what happened next epitomizes the difficulty of 
WMD interceptions. 
While accounts of what happened on-board the BBC China are still 
cloudy, the American-led team that seized the five containers of centrifuge parts 
apparently missed one other container.  This container came from a place other than the 
Malaysian factory of the others.  It was full of components for the P-2, the most advanced 
centrifuge available, and arrived in Libya unopened five months after the intercept of the 
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ship.  The George W. Bush Administration said the interdiction team reported that it 
would have been impossible to open all of the containers.167  
d. Military Action 
The PSI has yet to officially use force to stop would-be proliferators.  
While detecting WMD in a static on-board situation proves hard enough, the decision to 
use military force to stop or destroy an aircraft, ship, or land vehicle suspected of 
harboring WMD or related materials would be even more difficult and politically 
unsettling.  What happens if an aircraft refuses to comply with an order to land or not 
enter a PSI participant’s airspace?  How will air interdiction be conducted against aircraft 
on the ground?  The fact that PSI participants can only search for in-transit WMD when 
on-board the vessel makes it advantageous for the proliferating actor to dismiss requests 
to stop and search his vessel.  The PSI has yet to address the likelihood of using force and 
the means to assess the proportionality of the force needed to intercept aircraft suspected 
of carrying WMD. 
3. Operational Expectations 
The PSI set a high bar with the publication of its interdiction principles.  The 
expectation of PSI participants and supporters includes a community approach to WMD 
trafficking, not unlike the DEA.  Unfortunately for the PSI, dogs don’t sniff out WMD; 
and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are indiscriminate killers.  The ability to 
cover land, sea, and air routes, and stop, search, and seize all conceivable WMD material 
is today an unrealistic expectation.  A more realistic operational expectation is the ability 
to cooperatively and successfully act upon highly reliable intelligence and legal 
jurisdiction.  Once the decision to interdict is made, the vessel must be stopped, and the 
suspect material must be seized.   PSI participants will likely be fully engaged on a daily 
basis to meet this expectation, training and exercising to ensure the operational phase of 
the PSI is not its weakest link. 
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C. CURRENT SITUATION 
Rather than review the interdiction of the BBC China as an operational 
effectiveness barometer, a look at U.S. and PSI partner interdiction capabilities and the 
exercise regiment of the initiative more accurately identifies the focus, strengths, and 
weaknesses of PSI operations.  The United States provides much of the interdiction 
capability, but PSI partners add some high-technology assets and expand operational 
reach.  Joint PSI exercises began in September 2003 and are currently scheduled to 
continue through at least 2006.  They were initially scheduled as public relations tools to 
portray the operational image of the PSI.  Exercises have included ground, maritime, air-
interception, and international airport training scenarios.  PSI participants learn lessons 
from each exercise, some shared and some not.  The exercises continue to focus on the 
interoperability of interdicting agencies and detailed search and detection operations, but 
mostly in a static environment.  Missing is the practice of the question many PSI 
supporters don’t want to answer:  what if force is necessary?  A synopsis of PSI partner 
interdiction capabilities and exercise focus and lessons learned follows. 
1. Interdiction Capabilities 
The United States is the most capable PSI participant for performing interdictions.  
Land, sea, and air forces possess a variety a weapons and associated platforms to interdict 
enemy operations.  Table 3 summarizes U.S. interdiction capabilities. 
 
Land-and sea-based air forces employ missiles, bombs, precision-guided munitions, cluster 
munitions, land or sea mines, electronic warfare systems, and sensors from airborne platforms 
Naval forces employ missiles, munitions, torpedoes, and mines 
Land forces employ attack helicopters, missiles, artillery, and those forces capable of conducting 
conventional airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations 
Special operations forces may support conventional interdiction operations by providing terminal 
guidance for precision-guided munitions, or may act independently when the use of conventional 
forces is in appropriate or infeasible 
Table 3. U.S. Joint Interdiction Capabilities, from Joint Pub 3-03168                                                  
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Other coalition partners add significant capabilities to potential PSI interdiction 
operations.  First, they add third and fourth generation aircraft capable of interdicting any 
commercial aircraft in flight.  Second, they add naval fire assistance to a U.S. fleet that is 
stretched too thin at times.  Finally, they provide a geographical presence for the PSI 
interdiction forces.  Participating PSI countries are located sporadically across the globe 
on every continent but Antarctica.  This global disposition provides the needed reach for 
PSI interdiction operations.  
 The scope of these coalition interdiction capabilities was exemplified in the first 
U.S. / Iraqi Gulf War.  During the war, more than 165 ships from 19 coalition navies 
challenged more than 7,500 merchant vessels, boarded 964 ships to inspect manifolds and 
cargo holds, and diverted 51 ships carrying more than 1 million tons of cargo in violation 
of UN Security Council sanctions.  These interdiction activities completely suspended all 
high-volume imports to Iraq. 169  
The potential firepower of PSI partners to interdict suspected WMD trafficking 
exists.  Projecting this power will necessitate a high level of coordination between PSI 
participants. Troublesome is the fact that there are currently no permanent command and 
control (C2) networks established to govern interdiction operations under the PSI.  While 
the United States has taken on a political spokesman role, it has no permanent operational 
command authority over PSI forces.  Even within the United States, PSI C2 is ill-defined.  
Special Operations Command was first designated the executive agent for all matters 
related to the PSI for the U.S. DoD.  This designation lacked support and subsequent 
initiatives are being sought.  Without a formal C2 structure, PSI participants are taking 
turns as lead agencies for joint ground, sea, and air exercises. 
2.  Ground / Customs Exercises 
To date, one ground exercise and one customs exercise have been conducted in 
conjunction with PSI interdiction principles.  From 19-21 April 2004, Poland led exercise 
SAFE BORDERS in Wroclaw, Poland.  The exercise focused on customs and border 
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control procedures connected with movements of dangerous chemicals and other 
substances used for mass destruction arms.  PSI core member participants included 
Poland, Germany and the United States.  Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, 
Romania and Hungary also participated, while Australia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain observed.170 
Exercise HAWKEYE, a German-led 31 March – 1 April 2004 exercise at the 
Frankfurt main airport, trained civil defense personnel on the prevention of the transport 
of nuclear-related materials by means of air travel.  Main focal points of the exercise 
included a coordinated approach of competent airport authorities which allowed them to 
shape their collaboration during the exercise in a very realistic fashion and as 
authentically as possible.  PSI core participants included Germany, Singapore, Australia, 
and the United States.   The exercise was observed and evaluated by international experts 
from twenty-nine countries as well as the Commission of the European Union (EU) and 
the EU Council Office.171 
So what was accomplished by these ground exercises?  PSI participants practiced 
ground interdiction in the familiar realm of static border crossings and airports.   The 
exercises provided a good opportunity to fine-tune joint export control procedures, and 
important first line of defense in successful interdiction.  Troublesome is the fact that 
these ground exercises have yet to address the in-transit aspect of the PSI.  Until the 
initiative starts focusing its attention on the in-transit phase, the ground exercises are not 
much more than multinational export control cooperation drills.  This does not discount 
their utility, especially the role of airport security in PSI’s air interdiction phase. 
3.  Maritime Exercises 
With an initial and continued focus on the maritime arena, there have been five 
maritime exercises conducted thus far.  The first exercise, PACIFIC PROTECTOR, was 
led by Australia, with participation from the Japan, France, and the United States.  Many 
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other countries also observed the exercise.  In the exercise, a Japanese flagged vessel was 
intercepted by the Japanese Coast Guard in international waters.  The exercise tested the 
Coast Guard’s capability to react quickly to something being thrown overboard.  The ship 
also contained simulated chemical agents so specialist teams were able to do detection 
training.  This exercise highlighted the non-standardization of search and seizure 
techniques employed by different exercise participants.  This exercise also revealed the 
subtle differences in the way participating countries deploy their forces.  These 
differences included communications and force procedures.   The exercise was very 
much procedural; the emphasis was on interoperability, safety, and professionalism.  
Overrunning the ship and use of force were not exercised.172  
After two subsequent maritime exercises, led by French and Spanish agencies 
respectively, the United States took its turn at center stage with exercise SEA SABER, in 
January of 2004.  Taking place in the Arabian Sea, a key region of proliferation concern, 
the exercise utilized law enforcement and military assets from twelve of the sixteen PSI 
partner nations.  SEA SABER practiced a visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) 
operation.  The choreographed exercise tracked a suspicious vessel more than 1,200 miles 
into the Arabian Sea by a closely coordinated effort of partner ships and aircraft.  After 
permission was granted to board and search the vessel, partnership forces went into 
action.  PSI partners were pleased with exercise results.  One glowing report came from 
Singapore naval officer, Major Kwek Ju-Hon:  “We’ve been doing some fairly complex 
operations, like crossdeck landings and boarding training, and I think that says a lot for 
the interoperability of the countries involved in PSI.”173 The exercise was specifically 
designed as a cooperative exercise to enhance interoperability among multi-national 
forces in maritime interdiction operations, and proved successful in accomplishing its 
planned objectives.    
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The latest maritime exercise was conducted on 19-22 April 2004.  The Italian-led 
exercise CLEVER SENTINAL simulated the interception of a ship carrying WMD in the 
Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Sicily.  The cargo, headed to a potential terrorist 
organization, was intercepted by a group of Italian Navy Special Forces.  After the forces 
took control of the ship, a chemical, biological and radiological inspection team boarded 
the ship, found discrepancies with the ship’s cargo, and diverted it to Italian Coast Guard, 
Italian Ministry of Interior, and Italian Fire Department control.  Italian fire department 
personnel then screened the container to detect the nature of the cargo.174   
According to Lieutenant Larry Johnson, a Personnel Exchange Program member 
from the U.S. Navy, attached to the operation division of the Italian High Seas 
Commander, “the exercise addressed the short notice, quick response and quick 
integration of the force and moving forward to find the targets in a complex 
environment.”175 Lieutenant Johnson may be overstating the exercise contribution a bit.  
Boarding forces that gave way to inspectors who meticulously searched all cargo then 
diverted it to other agencies who conducted another long search is far from short notice, 
quick response.   
So what was accomplished by these maritime exercises?  The exercises started 
with a focus on interoperability, practiced the detection, search, and seizure aspects of 
future interdictions, and began addressing forceful entry procedures in the last exercise.  
The success of these exercises suggests that PSI interdiction principles are best suited for 
the maritime arena.   
4.  Air-interception Exercises 
Although three air-interception exercises have been conducted in conjunction 
with the PSI, public details of exercise objectives and results are few.  The first exercise, 
Air CPX, was led by United Kingdom.  The October 2003 exercise was conducted as a 
tabletop that explored operational issues regarding the interception of air traffic.  PSI took 
exercising air-intercepts a step further in February 2004 with the Italian-led exercise AIR 
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BRAKE 04.  In addition to Italy, the United States, Portugal, Spain and France 
contributed to the exercise by providing radar and air defense data to assist in tracking the 
target aircraft, in this case a U.S. Navy P-3.  During the exercise an Italian Air Force F-16 
intercepted the P-3.176  PSI participants further examined the prospect of air-intercepts in 
June 2004 with the French-led exercise APSE 04, details of which are not available at 
this time.     
So what was accomplished by these air-interception exercises?  Exercise 
participants claim they demonstrated that PSI is about interdiction of proliferation-related 
trafficking via various modes of transportation, including air.  While that is certainly true 
as far as official PSI rhetoric goes, there is no indication whether the air-interception 
exercises proved or disproved the effectiveness of the concept.   
D. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
Ground, maritime, and air PSI exercises continue to stress the importance of 
interoperability, and WMD detection procedures.  Significant challenges to PSI 
operational effectiveness remain in these areas.  Additionally, PSI exercises have yet to 
address, most likely due to its difficult nature, the challenge of using force when 
interdicting WMD shipments, especially air-intercepts.  These challenges are summarized 
below.   
1.   Interoperability 
Though unilateral interdiction operations are possible within the context of the 
PSI, most PSI planning is conducted on the assumption of alliance and coalition 
operations in scenarios that are difficult to predict and which often arise at short notice. 
With this in mind, the nature and composition of the interdicting force structure must be 
specific to requirement and based upon a general and flexible interdiction capability.  To 
achieve this, an assured capability for interoperability of information, tactics and 
procedures is essential.177  
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The interoperability challenge was addressed as early as the first PSI exercise, and 
continues to be a formal objective of subsequent training and exercises.  Apparent to PSI 
partners from the start were the international differences in tactics and procedures for 
stopping, searching, and seizing WMD.  According to the U.S. Department of State, 
interdiction efforts have tended to be ad hoc in the past.178 Although the PSI can bring 
multiple countries together into a cooperative interdiction operation, the effort remains 
largely ad hoc.  Countries have not identified dedicated PSI forces.  While PSI partners 
learn and cooperate in exercises, the parties involved in the exercises change.  When 
actual interdictions take place, there is no assurance that the individual parties involved 
have PSI exercise experience. 
The language barrier is another interoperability challenge.  Supporting command 
and control (C2) systems will be required to pass information within and across national 
and language boundaries. Moreover, tactical C2 information will flow to the operational 
and strategic levels of command including other governmental departments and non-
governmental organizations.179  Interdicting partners must be able to communicate with 
one another, and have a mechanism for coordinating with host nations that may not speak 
the same language. 
Global coverage of illegal transports necessitates the presence of equipment, 
personnel, and standardized reporting procedures in key ports and border crossings.  To 
facilitate this coverage, the United States has been assisting other countries in efforts to 
combat smuggling operations.  From 1992 through 2001, the United States spent $86 
million helping about thirty countries, mostly in the Former Soviet Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe.180  The help amounted to radiation detection equipment and training, 
technical exchanges to promote the development of laws and regulations, and other 
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equipment designed to improve their ability to interdict nuclear smuggling.181 Though 
U.S. assistance has strengthened the interdiction capability of these countries and has a 
direct positive impact on PSI operations, serious problems still exist.  The lack of 
oversight and follow-up from the installers has resulted in serious problems with 
installing, using, accounting for, and maintaining the equipment.  To make matters worse, 
many countries that received the detection equipment are not reporting information about 
the materials detected by the equipment.182 Many other PSI partners still lack the 
necessary equipment and training to effectively influence the interdiction process.  
Interoperability requires more than a commitment.  More commonality regarding 
materials, procedures, and reporting are required to make the PSI truly interoperable.   
2. Detection  
The fact that the PSI’s signature event, the interdiction of the BBC China, is now 
being evaluated more for what was missed than what was found is evidence of the 
challenge of detecting WMD weapons and materials.  Stopping a suspected trafficker is 
fruitless without a means to search and detect illicit materials.  Inspectors searching for 
WMD on ships, land vehicles, and grounded aircraft may be faced with searching 
hundreds of containers.  A full search would require off-loading the huge containers and 
reach-back of some sort.  A nuclear device or nuclear components could easily be 
transported in a ship’s cargo hold.  Finding the device in the right container could amount 
to finding a needle in a haystack.  Finding biological or chemical agents might prove 
more challenging than nuclear material detection.  For example, Anthrax spores that fill a 
salt shaker could expose and kill thousands of people before treatment could begin.183 A 
salt shaker on a ship or cargo plane filled with forty foot crates would prove difficult to 
find.   
The challenge of detecting, identifying, and characterizing WMD is not going 
unnoticed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DOE), and 
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intelligence community (IC).  The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee 
(CPRC) recently established Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACEs) for 2004.  These 
ACEs characterize areas where progress is needed to enhance warfighting capabilities.  
Detection of WMD is found throughout the list of ACE priorities as is interdiction of 
WMD (see table 4).184 In order for the PSI to succeed, PSI partners must address these 
same areas of concern. 
 
ACE Priorities 
DoD   DOE     IC             Areas for Capability Enhancements 
1           1                        Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of strategic, operational, and tactical     
                                        level actionable intelligence to support CP and CT   
2           2                        Detection, identification, characterization, location, prediction, and warning  
                                       of traditional and nontraditional CW and BW agents 
3           3                        Defense against, and detection, characterization and defeat of paramilitary, covert    
                                       delivery, and terrorist WMD capabilities 
4           2         5             Detection, location, and tracking of WMD/M and related materials, components, and   
                                       key personnel 
5           7                        Support for maritime, air, ground WMD/M interdiction, including special operations 
6                                     Enable sustained operations in a WMD environment through decontamination, and   
                                       individual and collective protection 
7                                     Medical protection, training, diagnosis, treatment, and countermeasures against    
                                       NBC agents, to include surge manufacturing capability and stockpile availability of    
                                       vaccines, pretreatments, therapeutics and other medical products 
Table 4. 2004 ACE Priorities, from Counterproliferation Program Review Committee 
 
 According to a U.S. State Department fact sheet, “PSI does not envision stopping 
and inspecting every shipment that might involve items that could be used in a WMD- or 
missile-related proliferation program; rather the United States intends to take action 
based on solid information.”185 Even the success of this rather conservative approach to 
stopping and seizing is limited by the ability of PSI forces to detect the WMD. 
3. Air-intercepts 
Missing from PSI exercises thus far has been the practice of using military force 
to interdict suspected WMD cargoes.  While force might be used in a non-compliant 
maritime boarding or an intercept of a ground vehicle, it is likely to take place in a                                                  
 
184 “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism,” 
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (May 2004), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nbcterror2004.pdf, last accessed Sep 04, 3. 
185 “Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” U.S. State Department (24 
May 2004), http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32725.htm, last accessed Aug 04. 
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controlled environment such as a naval blockades, ports, or border crossings.  This 
provides PSI participants with the luxury of searching for WMD while the vessel is 
stopped, or while on-board.  In addition, PSI forces would be given ample time to 
concentrate resources in the area of concern.  Assessing the WMD threat while on-board, 
and concentration of coalition forces is less applicable to air-intercepts.  A non-compliant 
aircraft, suspected of carrying WMD, over sovereign airspace, leaves the host nation with 
three choices:  allow passage, escort through landing, or shoot-down.  The decision to 
shoot-down, based on even the most reliable intelligence, is a risky proposition.   
In early 1994 the United States proposed a plan to provide radar-tracking and 
target-vectoring information to South American governments to facilitate the intercept of 
suspected drug-carrying aircraft.  A number of U.S. aviation organizations, including the 
Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association (AOPA) opposed the idea, but the proposal was 
nevertheless adopted by a number of countries.   While there are no numbers available as 
to the deterrent factor of the agreement, the AOPA’s concerns played out on 20 April 
2001.  On that date, Peruvian Cessna A-37Bs, armed versions of the Air Force T-37 
trainer, using tracking information provided by U.S. aerial surveillance, shot down an 
unarmed Cessna 185 cruising suspected of running drugs.  Tragically, the aircraft was not 
involved in the transport of drugs, but was filled with missionaries working for the 
Association of Baptists for World Evangelism.186 In the wake of the downing of the 
Cessna 185, organizations such as AOPA have called on the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and individual countries to reconsider rules allowing use of force 
against civil aircraft, reminding the ICAO of the unanimous decision of its members, 
following the shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (a 747) in 1984, that “every 
state must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.”187  
New York, Chicago, and Montreal Conventions established that aircraft cannot be 
forced down unless they pose an imminent threat.188  How imminent is the threat of a box 
                                                 
 
186 Kirby Harrison, “Shootdown of floatplane is warning signal for GA,” Aviation International News 
(June 2001), http://www.ainonline.com/issues/06_01/june_01_shootdownpg3.html, last accessed Aug 04. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Interviews with officials in the U.S. Office of Secretary of Defense. 
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of centrifuges, a vile of biological agents, or dangerous chemicals?  Even if the material 
is found, justifying the intercept, the question of intended use still remains.  When PSI 
interception forces are faced with the decision to shoot down a suspected WMD 
trafficker, they must be aware of the consequences of making a mistake.  Even if 
intelligence is reliable, and the interdicted aircraft was carrying WMD-related materials, 
the burden of proof would remain with the interdictor.  
Directing an aircraft to a place where it has to come down is an alternative air-
interception option.  When interdicting aircraft, time is an ally, and it is an advantage to 
string out the problem.  As long as the aircraft can be tracked, it will eventually need to 
land.  Aircraft escort is less effective in situations where intelligence suggests WMD will 
be released from on-board the aircraft.  Escort is also not possible in all cases.  There are 
times when the trafficking aircraft may be flying too high or too fast to be caught and 
escorted to the ground.  
E. OVERCOMING OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
1.   Overcoming the Interoperability Challenge 
While the PSI has taken steps in addressing the interoperability challenge through 
exercises and training, the challenge has yet to be attacked head-on.  Attacking the 
interoperability challenge must start with the procedural familiarity of the forces involved 
in interdiction activities.  PSI partners can take a page from the DEA’s book by creating 
dedicated PSI interdiction forces from each core member.  These PSI forces would 
provide continuity to training, exercises, and operations.   
The Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program was created by the DEA in early 
1995 as a response to the overwhelming problem of drug-related violent crime, 
increasing sophistication of drug-trafficking organizations, and the availability of 
automatic weapons that make drug law enforcement more difficult and dangerous than 
ever before. With police departments facing these challenges with smaller budgets and 
fewer police officers, the MET program helps local law enforcement entities attack the 
problem by: 
 Identifying major drug traffickers and organizations that commit 
homicide and other violent crimes; 
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 Collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence with state and local 
counterparts; 
 Cultivating investigations against violent drug offenders and gangs; 
 Arresting drug traffickers and assisting in the arrests of violent 
offenders and gangs; 
 Seizing the assets of violent drug offenders and gangs; 
 Providing support to federal, state, and local prosecutors.189 
When local police chiefs, county sheriffs, and state and local prosecutors feel that 
there is a need for MET assistance in their jurisdiction they can submit a written request 
to the DEA Special Agent in Charge responsible for their particular area.  Upon 
acceptance of a request, the MET in that jurisdiction sends a pre-deployment assessment 
team to meet with the requesting official and other cooperating local law enforcement 
agencies in order to evaluate the problem. The entire MET is then deployed to that city to 
begin investigative activity against the primary drug trafficking individuals and 
organizations identified in the pre-deployment assessment.  Upon completion of the 
MET-assisted operation, DEA officials meet with representatives of the requesting 
agency to evaluate the long-term success of the operation.   Assaults, homicides, and 
robberies have all greatly decreased as a result of MET deployments.190   
PSI partners should use the concept demonstrated by the MET to minimize 
interoperability challenges.  Due to intelligence sharing and legal constraints, a 
multinational combined PSI interdiction team would most likely be out of the question, 
but dedicated PSI forces could accomplish help overcome the interoperability challenge.   
The first step would be identification of personnel and equipment to be used by each PSI 
participant in the event of a joint interdiction operation.  Second, the personnel and 
                                                 
 
189 “Integrated Drug Enforcement Assistance.” 
190  Ibid.  As of April 1, 2002, the DEA had received 450 requests for MET deployments nationwide. 
Pursuant to these requests, a total of 339 deployments have been completed. These deployments have made 
a significant impact in neighborhoods across the United States. In areas where the DEA has deployed 
METs, assaults have been reduced by 15 percent, homicides by 14 percent, and robberies by 16 percent. 
METs have also contributed to the overall national decrease in violent crime: from 1993 to 1999 the 
number of violent crimes committed in the United States dropped by 26 percent. 
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equipment would be utilized in training and exercises among PSI partners.  This would 
build continuity within the joint interdiction process and trust between PSI contributors.  
Third, these PSI dedicated forces would establish joint operational plans, tactics, and 
communication mechanisms common to all coalition partners, that would be utilized in 
the event of an interdiction involving more than one PSI participant.  Fourth, these forces 
would become familiar with standardized detection and screening technology that would 
eventually need to be shared by all PSI supporters.  Establishing dedicated PSI forces 
would take PSI interoperability from the rhetoric to the action stage. 
2. Overcoming the Detection Challenge 
The key to overcoming PSI’s detection challenge is industry involvement.  
Technological advances in container control and detection systems will enable PSI 
interdiction teams to find the needle in a haystack that they are looking for.   Containers 
can be tampered with any point in the shipping process.  According to Stephen Flynn, a 
former Coast Guard commander, “Right now, there is no way we can actually verify from 
a security standpoint that what is loaded into the container at the starting point is really in 
there.”191 To combat this challenge a smart box cargo container is being developed by 
U.S. industry.  This container will electronically provide its location, indicate if it has 
been tampered with, sense biological, chemical or radioactive agents, and describe the 
type of cargo packed inside.  A first-generation model of this container is already in use 
at some foreign ports.  The next phase container will communicate its location using a 
satellite tracking system, the internet, or a system that employs cell phone like 
technology.  The cost of these containers is $700 to $1200 more than a standard cargo 
box.192 Replacing old cargo containers with new smart boxes would greatly enhance PSI 
interdiction operations.  PSI participants would incur the costs of the new containers, and 
would need to budget appropriately.  Augmenting the container technology are better 
detection systems, currently under development by U.S. industry.  
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Before revolutions in genomics, biotechnology, microengineering, and 
microcomputers, detection of biological agents could only be done in laboratories, taking 
days to weeks.  Soon, technological advances, many of them being made at Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratories, will make possible rapid, accurate, and sensitive biodetectors.193  
Similar advances in nuclear and chemical agent technology also exist, with several 
industry partners making significant advances.  PSI interdiction teams equipped with 
state of the art detection equipment would be given the best chance to find any WMD 
reported aboard the intercepted vessel.  Again, this equipment would not come without a 
cost to PSI partners.  Funds for this equipment must be set aside by the United States and 
other PSI core members, put into an international fund dedicated to PSI operations.   
3. Overcoming the Air-intercept Challenge 
As PSI participants begin to look deeply into the prospects of air-intercepts, it is 
necessary re-address the likelihood of success.  There is no easy answer to the challenge 
of using force during an air-intercept.  While shooting-down a suspect WMD carrier is 
not prudent, allowing proliferators free reign of the skies is even less sensible.  The best 
way to attack the air-interception challenge is from the ground.  While PSI participants 
can continue to practice air-intercepts, airport security and customs exercises such as 
HAWKEYE would prove more worthwhile in the long-run.  Careful screening of cargo 
and personnel with technologically advanced systems prior to take-off will avert many of 
the potential intercept situations.  Additionally, using the “what goes up must come 
down” principle, aircraft tracking systems and ground forces from the PSI’s sixty-plus 
supporting nations must be ready to meet these aircraft on the ground once they land. 
 F. CONCLUSION 
When intelligence is reliable and legal justification is available, PSI operations are 
expected to be successfully conducted.  In the way of this success are interoperability, 
detection, and use of force challenges.  Although interdiction operations are not a new 
response to the proliferation challenge, overcoming PSI operational challenges will 
                                                 
 
193 “Reducing the Threat of Biological Weapons,” www.llnl.gov/str/Milan.html, last accessed Aug 04.  
A miniature flow cytometer (known as miniflo) uses an immunoassay system to look at the proteins and 
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require new ways of thinking about the PSI force structure, new funding streams to 
secure detection technology necessary to find WMD, and a new approach to address the 
use of force during air-intercepts.  PSI interdiction principles, established a year ago, are 
said to have stood the test of time.  Closer to the truth may be the fact that they have not 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A. PSI REPORT CARD  
The research conducted in preparation of this thesis spurred development of a first 
year report card for the PSI.  The report card is a reflection of PSI performance against 
expectations addressed in this thesis.   
1. Expectations 
Table 5 lists expectations for PSI effectiveness.  They are pulled from established 
information sharing guidelines and interdiction principles and filtered through 









Global support of interdiction principles, focusing on non-state actors and 
countries of proliferation concern 
Exercises Portray the operational image of the PSI; improve interoperability of 
coalition forces; provide realistic training scenarios for PSI partners; address 
all aspects of potential PSI interdictions 
Intelligence 
 
Improve suspect procedures leading to intelligence failures in Iraq; achieve a 
level of assurance of intelligence reliability commensurate with the decision to 
use force; institute a high level of information sharing in accordance with 
information sharing guidelines  
Legal  Legally justify stopping, searching, seizing materials, or destroying in-transit 
vessels suspected of transporting WMD upon a decision to interdict  
Operational Cooperatively and successfully interdict WMD shipments upon receipt of 
highly reliable intelligence and legal jurisdiction in accordance with 
established interdiction principles 




The PSI concept effectively fills a gap in WMD nonproliferation efforts.  Still, 
significant challenges to PSI effectiveness exist in most areas, with intelligence 
challenges being foremost.  A PSI report card is provided in Table 6, highlighting the 




















Contribution to  
Nonproliferation 
Regime 
  x The initiative is fostering a norm to stop transfers and 
transactions of WMD programs.  The PSI triggers deterrence 
by denial by combining capabilities of partner nations.  
Finally, it takes disparate national efforts to interdict WMD 
shipments and gives them a unified multilateral structure.   
International 
Support 
 x  Since its May 2003 inception, the PSI resume includes 7 
international meetings, 15 core members, and over 60 
supporters for its interdiction principles.  Lack of Chinese 
support remains a hurdle to international acceptance of the 
initiative.  Failure to bring China aboard will impede future 
efforts to secure a PSI-specific UNSCR for the PSI, and will 
continue to free trafficking lanes for North Korea. 
Exercises  x  The exercises, initially scheduled as public relations tools, 
enhance the operational image of the PSI.  The exercises 
continue to focus on the interoperability of interdicting 
agencies and detailed search and detection operations, but 
mostly in a static environment.  Exercises have been 
marginally effective because they have not fully tackled the 
use of force, especially in air-intercepts, and they have relied 





x   Sharing intelligence is the biggest and most controversial 
challenge to PSI effectiveness.  Sharing restrictions also affect 
training and exercises, requiring watered-down intelligence 
cooperation.  The Cold War reliance on satellite technology 
and a lack of human intelligence sources creates an 
intelligence collection challenge for the PSI.  Poor intelligence 
estimates of Iraq’s WMD program enhance distrust for U.S. 
and British intelligence services and challenge the credibility 
of future PSI intelligence assessments.   
Legal   x  The UN LOS Convention, UN Charter Article 51, UNSCR 
1540, and the UNSC Presidential Statement of 1992 all hint at 
the importance of stopping WMD proliferators, but none 
specifically justify offensive interdiction operations as 
prescribed by PSI interdiction principles.   
Operational  x  Differences in tactics and procedures for stopping, searching, 
and seizing WMD abound from one PSI partner to another.  
The language barrier and technological differences in 
detection capabilities among PSI participants also hampers 
PSI interoperability.  The difficulty finding WMD once 
suspected is another operational challenge.  Firepower is not 
the issue for PSI operations, enough military capability and 
global coverage exists to conduct interdiction operations.   
Proportional use of this force, especially in air-intercept 
operations remains a challenge. 
Table 6. PSI Report Card 
 
B. MAKING THE GRADE 
In order for PSI participants to bring home a better report card next year, action is 
needed to address challenge areas.  Recommended short-term fixes, long-term solutions, 
and concepts worth exploring, designed to address PSI challenges, are described below.  
These recommendations fit into two general categories:  organize the activity and fill 




1. Organize the Activity 
Since its inception, the PSI has been described as an activity not an organization.  
While the action-oriented initiative has done well to avoid bureaucratic stagnation, some 
organization is needed to attack PSI challenges.   
a. Fund the Initiative (Short-term Fix) 
The key to overcoming PSI’s detection challenge is industry involvement.  
Technological advances in container control and detection systems will enable PSI 
interdiction teams to find the needle in a haystack that they are looking for.   PSI 
participants must be ready to budget for and incur the costs the new containers and 
detection devices currently being developed and tested by industry.  This will necessitate 
central or dedicated funding for the PSI within participating countries, or as part of a 
coalition funding line.  The first step for U.S. PSI support agencies would be the creation 
of program element for the PSI and establishment of funding lines for PSI-related 
equipment, technology, training, and exercises.  Taking this step would help validate the 
initiative as more than a temporary presidential focus area. 
b. Establish Dedicated PSI Forces (Long-term Solution) 
 Addressing operational challenges must start with the procedural 
familiarity of the forces involved in interdiction activities.  PSI partners can take a page 
from the DEA’s book by creating dedicated PSI interdiction forces similar to the DEA’s 
Mobile Enforcement Team that would provide continuity to training, exercises, and 
operations.  PSI partners should use the concept demonstrated by the MET to minimize 
interoperability challenges.  The first step would be identification of personnel and 
equipment to be used by each PSI participant in the event of a joint interdiction operation.  
Second, the personnel and equipment would be utilized in training and exercises among 
PSI partners.  This would build continuity within the joint interdiction process and trust 
between PSI contributors.  Third, these PSI dedicated forces would establish joint 
operational plans, tactics, and communication mechanisms common to all coalition 
partners, that would be utilized in the event of an interdiction involving more than one 
PSI participant.  Fourth, these forces would become familiar with standardized detection 
and screening technology that would eventually need to be shared by all PSI supporters.  
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Establishing dedicated PSI forces would take PSI interoperability from the rhetoric to the 
action stage. 
 c. Establish a Trusted Information Network (Idea Worth Exploring) 
 Intelligence sharing challenges can be potentially overcome by replacing 
existing hub-and-spoke information databases with a PSI trusted information network.  
Under this concept, intelligence agencies of PSI partners would still have their own 
databases, but they would be searchable across PSI participants.  Secrets would be 
protected through the design of the network and an information rights management 
approach that controls access to data, not access to the whole network.  The technology 
needed to adopt such a concept exists.  Adopting such a network would minimize many 
of the intelligence challenges facing PSI partners.  First, the network would maximize 
collection capabilities by combining available technical data with human intelligence 
from PSI collectors across the globe.  Second, the network would facilitate a high degree 
of intelligence sharing among PSI partners, widening sharing from a bilateral to a 
multilateral basis.  Third, the network would inherently build trust in the intelligence 
shared through it.  Finally, this network would be an integral part of PSI exercises and 
training, thus allowing PSI partners to have a consistent mechanism for sharing 
intelligence.   
  A trusted information network would require a governing body 
responsible for the planning, resources, and enforcement of information sharing 
guidelines.  NATO appears to be a good choice to test the concept.  During the June 2004 
Istanbul summit, NATO leaders established the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, created 
after the September 11 attacks, as the permanent body under which this intelligence 
sharing takes place.  A NATO-administered trusted information network would require 
the insertion of an additional article into the North Atlantic Charter, formalizing 
intelligence and law enforcement cooperation as well as institutionalizing cooperation 
and intelligence-sharing.  In addition, NATO would be required to act as the network’s 
watch-dog, quickly punishing breaches of established information sharing procedures.  A 
PSI-specific trusted information network that accounts for non-NATO PSI participants 
would be a logical follow-on to the NATO network.   
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2. Fill Current Gaps  
To overcome challenges to PSI effectiveness, gaps must be filled.  Filling 
operational gaps, international support gaps, and legal gaps will improve overall PSI 
effectiveness.   
a. Fill Operational Gap (Short-term Fix) 
 PSI participants must start moving from low-hanging fruit to the harder to 
reach areas.  Answering the hard questions must start with exercises and training and 
extend to rethinking the likeliness of air-interception of WMD traffickers.  PSI exercises 
have yet to address, most likely due to its difficult nature, the challenge of using force 
when interdicting WMD shipments.  Ground exercises must start addressing the in-transit 
aspect of the PSI.  Until the initiative starts focusing its attention on its regularly 
advertised in-transit phase, the ground exercises are not much more than multinational 
export control cooperation drills.  Maritime exercises must continue to address forceful 
entry procedures first practiced in the last PSI maritime exercise.  The best way to attack 
the air-interception challenge is from the ground.  While PSI participants can continue to 
practice air-intercepts, airport security and customs exercises would prove more 
worthwhile in the long-run.  Careful screening of cargo and personnel with 
technologically advanced systems prior to take-off will avert many of the potential 
intercept situations.   
b. Fill the International Support Gap (Short-term Fix) 
North Korea, a main target of the PSI, has shipped missile and nuclear 
technology and is reportedly working to combine these technologies.  Chinese 
participation in the PSI would greatly enhance the Asian interdiction effectiveness, and 
provide an added factor to the cost / benefit analysis of the North Koreans.  The United 
States needs to take a proactive role in assisting Chinese efforts to implement its new 
export control regulations, shape Beijing perspectives on nonproliferation by engaging in 
strategic dialogue, and encourage Chinese membership in the PSI.  After gaining Russian 
support, the U.S. State Department is now rightly focusing on China.  Chinese support of 
PSI interdiction principles would allow the initiative to balance its individual strengths 
with internationally recognized justification through the support of UNSC.   
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b. Fill the Legal Gap (Long-term Solution) 
Chinese support would clear some current obstacles to a PSI-specific 
UNSCR. A UNSCR represents the best chance for the across-the-board PSI legal 
legitimacy.  While UNSCR 1540 acknowledges the need for better legal and regulatory 
frameworks to prevent illicit trafficking to non-state actors, it does specifically add legal 
justification for PSI interdictions.  A UNSCR authorizing these interdictions would 
provide blanket legal authority for the PSI.  Even with Chinese support, adopting this 
resolution will be difficult given that there is nothing in the UN Charter that gives the 
Security Council the specific authority to adopt global legislation for WMD interdiction.  
C. BOTTOM LINE 
The interdiction of the BBC China serves as the highpoint in the PSI’s short 
existence.  Prospects for future WMD interdictions are largely dependent on overcoming 
intelligence, legal, and operation challenges to PSI effectiveness.  These challenges are 
not unconquerable, but will require some organization, some revolutionary thinking, 
some gap-filling, and some funding.  Even if these challenges are overcome, the PSI will 
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